

OTWELL LIBRARY
DEC 22 1919
DIV. OF MICH.

The Nation

[REG. U. S. PATENT OFF.]

Vol. CIX, No. 2842

COPYRIGHT, 1919, BY THE NATION PRESS, INC.

Saturday, December 20, 1919

Now for Woman Suffrage

An Editorial

The Courts and the Coal Strike

An Editorial

Wherein the Allies Failed

Prince Max of Baden

The End of Boston's Police Strike

Arthur Warner

The Nation and the Printers' League

A Statement

The Blind War

B. Roustam Bek

Ten Cents a Copy

Four Dollars a Year

Published weekly at 20 Vesey St., New York. Entered as second-class matter December 12, 1887, at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879

The New York Times says:

VICENTE BLASCO IBANEZ

is by all means the dominant figure in the fiction field of 1919. . . . He is a great, creative artist, a reporter of life, who paints the human tragi-comedy with masterful strokes and in beautiful realistic colors on a canvas which he not once allows to get out of focus. . . . All his writings are marked by an acute sense of the artistic value of contrasts and by a remarkable gift for telling a story dramatically without moralizing.

Author of

MARE NOSTRUM

THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE

The Shadow of the Cathedral Blood and Sand La Bodega

Each Net \$1.90

New Novels

THE WORKS OF LEONARD MERRICK

"It is the special power of Mr. Merrick that he writes with an ease of touch, a speed of style and a fine, sure hand, that sweeps us on with thoughtful laughter to the splendid closes. . . . The publishers deserve thanks for presenting to American readers at large this interesting and worthy edition."—*Atlantic Monthly*.

Now Ready

Conrad in Quest of His Youth
The Actor-Manager. Cynthia
The Position of Peggy Harper
The Man Who Understood Women
While Paris Laughed

Each, net, \$1.75

LIGHT

By HENRI BARBUSSE

"A franker study of man, an honest avowal, a more austere example of analytical and artistic integrity than this novel presents will be hard to find in current literature."—*Washington, D. C., Star*. \$1.90

THE STREET OF ADVENTURE

By PHILIP GIBBS

"We know no novel so rich in comprehension of all that makes and breaks and fascinates in the newspaper world."—*Boston Herald*. \$1.90

SILVER AND GOLD

By DANE COOLIDGE

The *San Francisco Chronicle* calls this "a rattling story and as good as a movie melodrama any evening." \$1.75

THE HOMESTEAD

By ZEPHINE HUMPHREY

"This book could have been written only by an American of insight and perception of spiritual values."—*Maurice Francis Egan in The Catholic World*. \$1.90

For the Dog-Lover

LAD: A DOG

By ALBERT PAYSON TERHUNE

"Mr. Terhune has never written a more fascinating tale than this true record of the deeds of a noble-hearted dog. . . . All dog-lovers will welcome this book with delight."—*Christian Endeavor World*. \$2.00

A DOG DAY

By WALTER EMANUEL. Pictured by CECIL ALDIN

The diary of a pet pup for "one dernd dull day." "And what a day that pup had!" *Boston Globe*. \$1.00

SIGURD, OUR GOLDEN COLLIE

By KATHARINE LEE BATES

Sigurd was a personality in the lovely college world of Wellesley, and this chronicle is a tender, whimsical tribute to more than Sigurd—to the friends with whom memories of Sigurd and the other "comrades of the road" are intertwined. \$2.00

Poetry, Literature, Etc.

LIFE'S MINSTREL

By DANIEL HENDERSON

"The Road to France deserves to be ever read, and the praise it received is only a forecast of the fame awaiting its author."—*M. Jusserand*. \$1.50

ARIZONA AND OTHER POEMS

By ELISE PUMPELLY CABOT

Poems of the West, in free verse-forms, that interpret nature from the point of view of a modernist in art and philosophy. *In press*

THE SYMBOLIST MOVEMENT

STUDIES IN THE ELIZABETHAN DRAMA

By ARTHUR SYMONS

Studies by a critic whom the *Boston Herald* calls "A connoisseur of souls and the liberal arts; a poet whether writing in prose or verse." Each, \$3.50

A NEW STUDY OF ENGLISH POETRY

By SIR HENRY NEWBOLT

"I have felt our need of such a book for the last fifteen years."—*Charles Wharton Stork*. \$3.00

THE DICKENS CIRCLE

By J. W. T. LEY

"Even a fame so great as Dickens' may be added to by this book, into the making of which so much friendliness has gone."—*The Nation*. \$6.00

TRADITION AND CHANGE

By ARTHUR WAUGH

"Here is the very spirit of right judgment, and embodying that spirit is language that is mellow and urbane."—*Springfield Republican*. \$3.00

THE SOCIAL PLAYS OF PINERO

Edited by CLAYTON HAMILTON

"It is a distinct service to English dramatic literature that the Pinero theatre should find its way to the printed page in uniform volumes."—*New York World*. Three volumes now ready. Each, \$3.00

WILLIAM BLAKE: THE MAN

By CHARLES GARDNER

A study of the artist, poet, and mystic, leading to an interpretation of the man. Illustrated by reproductions of Blake's work, some from private sources hitherto unpublished. \$4.00

A GENERAL SKETCH OF EUROPEAN LITERATURE

By LAURIE MAGNUS

Briefly but with an amazing amount of organized detail the author carries out a suggestion given by Sir Edward Dowden for a history of European literature that would give the "headquarters of literature" in each age. This volume carries the history through the Centuries of Romance. \$7.00

POSTAGE EXTRA, ORDER
OF YOUR BOOKSELLER

E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

681 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK

The Nation

FOUNDED 1865

Vol. CIX

NEW YORK, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1919

No. 2842

Contents

EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS	783
EDITORIAL ARTICLES:	
The Lesson of the Supreme Council.....	786
The Courts and the Coal Strike.....	787
Now for Woman Suffrage.....	788
The Voice of the Churches.....	788
An International Saint.....	789
THE END OF BOSTON'S POLICE STRIKE. By Arthur Warner.....	790
THE NATION AND THE PRINTERS' LEAGUE.....	793
THE BLIND WAR. By B. Roustam Bek.....	795
CORRESPONDENCE	797
VISITATION. By Richard Dehmel. Translated by Leonora Speyer.....	799
LITERATURE:	
The New Asia	799
Government Organization	800
Behind the Army	801
The Elder Novelists	801
BOOKS IN BRIEF	802
ART: A Right Way to Use Museums. By N. N.	804
DRAMA: The Cult of Prettiness. By L. L.	805
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SECTION	807

PUBLISHED WEEKLY BY THE NATION PRESS, INC.

OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD HENRY RAYMOND MUSSEY
EDITOR MANAGING EDITOR
WILLIAM MACDONALD { FRED A. KIRCHWEY
ARTHUR WARNER { ASSOCIATE EDITORS MABEL H. B. MUSSEY

SUBSCRIPTION RATES—Four dollars per annum, postpaid in the United States and Mexico; to Canada, \$4.50, and to foreign countries of the Postal Union, \$5.00.

THE NATION, 20 Vesey Street, New York City. Cable Address: NATION, NEW YORK. Chicago Office: 1170 People's Gas Building. British Agents for Subscriptions and Advertising: Swarthmore Press, Ltd., 72 Oxford St., London.

THE faintly conciliatory tone and the vague concessions of the Allied note of last week seem to have aroused in the German press a hope that further discussion may temper the harshness of the terms of the protocol, the text of which is printed elsewhere in this issue, to the shorn resources of Germany. In spite of the defiant gesture of Herr Noske, who announced that he would recommend a refusal of the terms and virtually dared the Allies to occupy Germany, the Ebert Government is evidently looking for a way of acceding to the Allied demands while at the same time maintaining its dignity and prestige. In its note of December 14, the Government expressed its desire for an early ratification of the treaty, and suggested that the question of reparation for the sinkings at Scapa Flow be further considered, since the tonnage demands of the Allies cannot be complied with. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly has decided to send a mission of experts to Paris in the hope of convincing the Supreme Council of the inability of Germany to carry out the protocol provisions for the surrender of dock and harbor equipment. It is reported that Germany possesses only 120,000 tons of such equipment beyond the 400,000 tons demanded by the Allies, and that important ports, among them Hamburg, will be practically rendered useless for large ships if the demands are insisted upon. The rumor that an agreement has been reached at the Allied conference at London to answer any such temporizing on the part of Germany with a virtual ultimatum has been strengthened by the reported existence of "an inter-Allied military organization," under Marshal Foch, to insure the

execution of the treaty. The internal position of the German Government is slightly improved by the fact that the Independent Socialists have steadily supported a conciliatory policy toward the Allies. The rumored agreement between the Independent and the Majority Socialists, on the other hand, has so far failed to materialize.

THE unprecedented visit of Premier Renner to Paris presents the Austrian situation in dramatic and simple terms. Dr. Renner comes to intercede with the Supreme Council, not for concessions or modifications in treaty terms, but for the sheer physical life of his country. By blockade, embargo, and dismemberment the Allies have made of Austria a half-dead nation; now, if there is to be any Austria which shall pay indemnities or make reparations, the Allied Powers must apply some swift and sure method of resuscitation. If Austria is not saved, Premier Renner will be forced, he says, immediately to resign his office and allow the Government to fall. The forces of revolution in Austria have been held in check for months by the hope of material aid; if this hope is thwarted and aid is refused or postponed, revolution must surely come. Premier Renner has evidently made a marked impression at Paris. The press unanimously urges relief for Austria, although several of the Paris papers, as well as Dr. Renner himself, turn to the United States as the nation in the most favorable position to help. The friendly attitude of official and unofficial Paris lends new interest to recent rumors in financial circles of extensive credits to be offered to Austria, in which individual American banks may participate.

DURING the twenty days between the convening of the Italian Parliament, on December 1, and the Christmas recess, the activities of the new Socialist majority have generated heat rather than either light or power. The proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies have been marked by noisy demonstrations directed against the King, the war, the Pope, the Church, and the Parliament itself; while the country has been torn by general political strikes, attended with riots, and clashes between strikers and soldiers. The Socialist leaders and press frankly announce their intention of discrediting the institution of parliamentary government. Complete Socialist control of the Chamber will probably be prevented by an informal, if not explicit, coalition of the scattered parties of the Right, although such coalition is seriously hampered by long-standing rivalries between the conservative groups. The combined anti-Socialist vote, on the other hand, has won an important victory in the election of Signor Orlando as President of the Chamber; but the efforts of the Socialists and the Republicans to secure the abolition of the oath of allegiance pledging loyalty "to the King and his successors" have failed. Meanwhile, the political situation is further complicated by the continued activities of Captain d'Annunzio. Party lines have been broken, issues confused, and domestic problems all but forgotten in the heat of the battle along the Adriatic. By agreement with Premier Nitti, d'Annunzio is now to evacu-

ate Fiume, which will thereupon be taken possession of by Italy; while the Government through its Foreign Minister, Signor Scialoja, is reported to have carried on satisfactory conversations at London with a view to a settlement of the whole Adriatic question. If d'Annunzio undertakes his proposed aerial flight to the United States by way of Japan and the Pacific, or, as he intimated in a recent interview, moves his battlefront to "Ireland and unhappy Egypt," the Italian situation may from his absence gain an unwonted coherence.

SIR GEORGE PAISH, the well-known English authority on finance, is convinced that the international financial situation is going from bad to worse, and that a crisis of world-wide proportions is imminent. "Unless the entire problem," he declares in a recent issue of the *London Globe*, "is soon dealt with in all its aspects, a complete breakdown of credit, of exchange, of commerce, and of trade must occur in the not distant future." The only hope, he thinks, lies in collective action, and particularly in the further extension of American credit and in such modifications of the American tariff as will enable Europe to purchase American goods. American bankers, on the other hand, show as yet little disposition to enlarge greatly their European operations, partly, it would seem, because many of them feel that American credit cannot safely be much further expanded until American imports increase, and partly because foreign securities are still regarded as a doubtful investment. The British Government, it is said, does not contemplate any action intended to check the further decline of the pound sterling. Meantime, the American Chamber of Commerce at London reports that British merchants are planning to capture the important trade of the Baltic provinces, and are buying American goods to sell to the Letts and the Estonians. The entire exportable surplus of Estonian timber for the next eighteen months has, it is said, been sold to Great Britain in return for supplies which will be drawn largely from the United States. Figures of British trade with Germany show a large excess of exports over imports; the Dutch are loaning considerable sums to Germany now that America has left them the field; and trade between Germany and France is increasingly active. Valuable mineral deposits in Austria are reported to have been acquired recently by Italian interests. It is difficult to reconcile such reports of commercial activity with sober predictions of impending financial collapse, huge as is the volume of debt in comparison with assets. One may fairly question, however, whether American bankers are not losing opportunities for the legitimate extension of American credit abroad, at the same time that they are withholding financial aid which is needed on humanitarian grounds.

RARELY has an industrial disturbance left in its wake a situation uglier and more serious than that which follows the steel strike. If the forces of reaction had been deliberately planning for revolution, they could scarcely have played their cards better. Judge Gary, speaking for big business, has throughout truculently refused even to meet union leaders, and on December 5 he went so far as to decline the mediation of the Commission of Inquiry of the Inter-Church World Movement, "on the ground that the men still out were Bolshevik radicals who were not wanted in the mills and would not be taken back." Face to face with this implacable hostility, the men have from the beginning

had less than half-hearted support from the quarter where they should have commanded unlimited help, namely, the American Federation of Labor. The local authorities in Pennsylvania, too often completely under the domination of the steel companies, have shown a brazen disregard of law and a shocking readiness to violate the fundamental Constitutional rights of strikers; while the State constabulary—"Cossacks" as they are now known throughout the steel towns—have inaugurated a White Terror that will live for decades in the memory of American workingmen. In the face of misrepresentation, injustice, intimidation, violence, and deliberate provocation to disorder, the men have for almost three months carried on an unsuccessful strike in a spirit of extraordinary self-restraint, patience, and regard for the law so wantonly violated by its sworn guardians. Yet despite the solidarity among workers of a dozen different nationalities and languages, the strike is gradually crumbling under the steady blows of a relentless industrial autocracy; and, if we are not mistaken, the seed of revolution is being planted in fertile soil.

WHAT has been the actual effect of the strike on production it is by no means easy to determine, and the exact future consequences are difficult to forecast. The National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers on November 30 quoted the American Iron and Steel Institute as estimating the shortage in pig iron up to November 1 at 2,893,721 tons. The committee put the shortage of steel in all shapes on November 30 at more than 5,000,000 tons. On the other hand, the *Iron Age* of November 27 estimated the loss of output from the strike at from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 tons of finished material—doubtless a conservative figure. Pig iron production was at the rate of 60,115 tons a day during October and 79,745 tons during November, as against 112,482 and 111,802 tons during the corresponding two months last year. The present calendar year will show an output of about 30,000,000 tons, as compared with 39,054,644 last year and 39,434,797 in 1916, the record year. The Pittsburgh correspondent of the *Evening Post* states that steel production just before the strike was from 80 to 85 per cent. of capacity, but that at the end of November the output did not exceed 60 or 65 per cent., a result which he attributes to the inefficiency of labor. While the *Iron Age* declares that the outlook for any material increase of production in the near future is not promising, the *Evening Post's* correspondent estimates ingot production for the twelve months ending November 30, 1920, at no less than 40,000,000 tons, as against 32,000,000 tons during the twelve months just past. It is hard to see where such increased production is to come from. Large numbers of foreign workers have gone home, creating a serious shortage of common and semi-skilled labor. Reports of accidents in the mills are frequent, though every precaution is taken to prevent reports from leaking out. There have apparently been serious disturbances also within some of the plants, while the bringing in of Negro strike-breakers has created an ugly race problem in many places. Altogether, labor conditions are about as bad as possible, and there is little reason for anticipating output from discontented men smarting under the lash of industrial absolutism. Yet the most roseate predictions of iron and steel earnings continue current. The men who own our iron mines and steel mills may perhaps get profits; but the public may well be pardoned a doubt whether it is to get steel.

THE Cummins Railway bill, the passage of which the other day by the Senate was prevented only by the timely opposition of Senator La Follette, is still a menace. The bill provides for the return of the railways to private ownership, but with Federal incorporation and the representation of classified employees and the Government on the boards of directors; the consolidation of all railway properties into from twenty to thirty-five systems, substantially as has been done under Federal administration; the enlargement of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission to include supervision of stock and bond issues and the regulation of rates; the creation of a committee on wages and working conditions, made up of four employees and four representatives of the companies, to deal with disputes in the first instance; and the prohibition of strikes and lockouts. The Esch bill, which is before the House of Representatives, is a companion measure providing for the return of the railways to their owners and their operation and control through the Interstate Commerce Commission, but without Federal incorporation; and also, by amendment in the House, omitting the provision for the settlement of disputes over wages and working conditions. Whether or not it be true, as press reports state, that a propaganda fund of \$10,000,000 has been provided by the security holders in order to insure the return of the railways to private hands, the editorial and advertising pages of the American press afford abundant evidence that the Cummins-Esch measures are receiving systematic and powerful support. The Farmers' National Council, which is working to defeat both bills and to secure the continuance of government operation, declares that the passage of either bill would be equivalent to granting a billion-dollar annual subsidy to the railways, together with an increase of 25 per cent. in freight rates and an addition, on the basis of Director General Hines's figures, of \$4,375,000,000 to the cost of what the public eats, uses, or wears.

THAT the Committee of Forty-Eight should have had to resort to an injunction at St. Louis last week in order to insure its Constitutional right of assembly and free speech, affords striking proof of the need of organized effort if the liberties of the American people are to be recovered and preserved. The extreme moderation in which the Committee clothes its liberalism will not, we hope, handicap its usefulness or divert public attention from the seriousness of the evils which it attacks or the substantial merits of the reforms which it purposes. The platform adopted by the conference was brief, but fundamental so far as it went. It called for government ownership of natural resources and means of transportation; withdrawal of the right to hold land out of use for speculation; equal rights for all citizens, irrespective of sex or color; restoration of the Constitutional guarantees of free speech, a free press, and freedom of assembly; and the abolition of injunctions in labor cases. A resolution opposing universal military training and compulsory military service except in case of invasion was adopted, but a proposal of Federal legislation forbidding the deportation of alien radicals was rejected. Representatives of the Nonpartisan League sat in the conference—a matter of some interest in view of the growing strength of the League in the Middle and Northwestern States. On the whole the platform of the Committee, like its membership, is fairly representative of the liberal sentiment which, while repelled by the reactionary spirit more and more in evidence in the Republican and Democratic

parties, is nevertheless reluctant to ally itself with any distinctly radical movement. We hope that the Committee will push its campaign with vigor, and will not fear, when occasion demands it, to call a spade a spade.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S proclamation regarding the census of 1920 is a unique document. After reciting that the decennial enumeration of the population called for by the Constitution will begin on January 2, and that every person is required by law to answer the questions on the census schedules applicable to him, the President hastens to declare—incorrectly, as it happens—that “the sole purpose of the census is to secure general statistical information regarding the population and resources of the country”; that “no person can be harmed in any way by furnishing the information required”; that the census “has nothing to do with taxation, with military or naval service, with the compulsion of school attendance, with the regulation of immigration, or with the enforcement of any national, State, or local law or ordinance”; and that “there need be no fear that any disclosure will be made regarding any individual person or his affairs.” The inspiration, and to some extent the language, of this remarkable appeal appear to have been drawn from a leaflet just issued by the Director of the Census, in which, in connection with brief information about the census and a list of some of the questions to be asked, the earnest hope is expressed that “clergymen, editors, school teachers, employers, agricultural agents, and other public-spirited citizens who come in contact with large numbers of people will grasp every opportunity to correct any erroneous opinions about the census which they may hear.” We do not recall at the moment any other instance in which either the President or a Federal administrative chief has felt it necessary to ask the people to please be so good as to obey a law which is about to be enforced, and to rest assured that obedience will do them no harm.

THE Associated Teachers Union of New York city has announced itself with an unfortunately awkward gesture. Its constitution, and its circular letter inviting eligible teachers to join the Union, are badly written and inaccurately printed; its officers are, with one or two exceptions, not well known. Moreover, while it has been more or less neglected by the press at large, it has been preposterously hailed by the *New York Call* as an immediate menace to all of the sixteen schools and colleges which may be represented on its rolls. Actually, all that has occurred is the mere publication of a program long discussed and still longer needed, but postponed until now by the timid conservatism of the teachers themselves. That a beginning should have been made at all reveals the growth among the teachers of a conviction that only by some sort of organization can their present desperate economic status be improved. As *The Nation* pointed out in its issue of November 29, higher salaries for teachers can be obtained only by adding to the total cost of education, on which the country expends far too little. Such an increase a proper organization of the teachers can do much to direct, even to compel. It is by all means to be hoped, too, that the new Union will be able to carry out its avowed object of helping to democratize educational institutions. In the long run, however, the movement should derive its chief importance from the effect it will have of breaking down the barriers traditionally maintained between head-workers and hand-workers.

The Lesson of the Supreme Council

MR. FRANK L. POLK, the head of the American peace delegation at Paris, persists in taking a hopeful view of the world situation. "The laborious edifice of world peace," he is reported to have said in a public statement just before leaving for home, "is on the eve of achievement." We heartily wish that we could agree with him. We should be glad indeed if, scanning the horizon with Mr. Polk and his associates, we could descry a sign of peace as big even as a man's hand. Yet we should be doing injustice to Mr. Polk's intelligence and information if we did not think that he knows better than to indulge in such worn-out optimism as he is credited with expressing. Mr. Polk and his colleagues may have lived a cloistered life at Paris, but they have nevertheless met unnumbered representatives of the many interests with which they have had to deal, and have had access to a wealth of information and advice such as no other group of officials could command. Yet they must know perfectly well, whatever they may say for public consumption, that their labors have brought to a distressed world neither peace nor the hope of peace, and that the "laborious edifice" at which they have worked houses far more of discord and failure than of contentment and good will.

What makes such grandiloquent pronouncements as that of Mr. Polk the more distasteful is the fact that everybody now knows how great and dreadful the failure has been, and the reasons for it. From the moment when Mr. Wilson, entering the Peace Conference with a wealth of world influence and prestige such as no head of a great nation had ever possessed, abandoned his demand for "open covenants of peace openly arrived at," the fate of the Conference was sealed. The one great safeguard against political intrigues and nationalistic schemes, the one assurance that the peace, however far-reaching or drastic its provisions, would regard the desires of peoples rather than register the ambitions of diplomatists and politicians, was gone, and the way was open for the revival of an old and noxious political order which the war had been fought to destroy. Once the Big Five, with no other argument save that of might, arrogated to themselves the right to control the decisions of the Peace Conference and retired behind closed doors to deliberate and act in secret, the ultimate outcome was easily forecast. The experts whom the members of the Conference had summoned to advise them had no option save to bow to the will of the five dictators or to resign; and few resigned. The Powers not of the elect Five must go into opposition, or scheme and bargain, or bide their time. The peace of peoples became first a term to conjure with, then a mockery, and in the end a lie.

Yet the opportunity to build an edifice of peace such as Mr. Polk and others still, apparently, affect to see was as clear as it was unprecedented. Whether Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points constituted, in the mind of their author, a well-considered and comprehensive program of details, or whether they were intended only as an indication of general principles in accordance with which peace ought to be made, they had laid the foundations upon which the reconstruction of a warring world might easily have proceeded. How elemental and sweeping they appear now that the horrid mess which Mr. Wilson and his associates have made of

them is everywhere known! A diplomacy proceeding "always frankly and in the public view"; freedom of the seas "alike in peace and in war"; the removal of economic barriers between nations; reduction of armaments "to the lowest points consistent with domestic safety"; an adjustment of all colonial claims "free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial"; for Russia "an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy"; the restoration of Belgium and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France; readjustment of the Italian frontiers along lines of nationality "clearly recognizable"; autonomy for the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, and for Serbia "free and secure access to the sea"; the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty, but with autonomy for other nationalities hitherto under Turkish rule; an independent Poland; a league of nations. Such was the edifice for whose uprearing the world stood waiting in expectancy.

It is hard to see how Mr. Polk, straining his eyes however intently, can discover the outlines of a building of this great sort in the Europe to which he has just bidden adieu. Of open diplomacy there has at no time been even a trace. Freedom of the seas has been forgotten. The economic barriers which have impeded trade between nations still continue, and have even been piled higher. The weight of armaments bids fair to rival that of the decade before the war. Germany has been stripped of its colonies for the benefit of the Allies, Great Britain getting the most, while no other colonial claims have been considered. The treatment of Russia, in very truth the "acid test" of Allied intelligence, sympathy, and honor, has been one long tale of lying pretense. Austria is being strangled to death, Hungary is famine-stricken and in political turmoil, Rumania has successfully played the robber in defiance of the Council, Serbia has as yet no access to the sea, and the Italian frontier illustrates chiefly the principle of imperialistic greed; while as regards Turkish sovereignty there has been no settlement at all. Even the league of nations, abruptly shifted by Mr. Wilson from the end to the beginning of his international program, is still to be born.

That the Supreme Council, whether as the mouthpiece of the Peace Conference or as a practically independent body, should have failed so miserably in most of the tasks which it undertook, is to be ascribed far less to the difficulties which it faced than to its own invincible obtuseness and reactionary temper. The Council has not been uninformed so much as it has been unenlightened and inept. If it sympathized with, or indeed even comprehended, the ideas of liberty and bettered social organization which awakened minds are everywhere struggling to realize, it gave small intimation of the fact. If it did not deliberately intend to strengthen the forces of reaction and check the growth of democratic government and institutions, it nevertheless pursued a policy which could have no other result. For the palpable failure of its efforts for peace, as for the contempt into which it fell, it had only itself to thank; and for its dissolution there will be only a sigh of relief. It is for the peoples of the world, acting through governments which they themselves control, to achieve now the "laborious edifice" of peace.

The Courts and the Coal Strike

THE decision of the leaders of the United Mine Workers of America to accept the proposal of President Wilson for ending the coal strike is naturally a cause of general relief and satisfaction. Some 400,000 men will probably go back to the bituminous coal mines, after a six weeks' absence, and a regular supply of a product that all the world needs may again be assured. The miners are to receive an immediate increase of 14 per cent. in their earnings, without raising the price of coal to the public, while the question of further wage advance is left to an arbitration commission which is to report within sixty days. It would be a mistake, however, to regard the present agreement as more than a truce unless there is subsequent effort to adjust fundamental economic wrongs; and it is also much to be regretted that the two great legal issues in the controversy seem likely to be left unsettled, except in so far as victory rests with the Administration at Washington by default. In that case it is highly probable that such advantage as the Government has gained will be used as a precedent against labor in the future. We have already discussed various questions of ethics and public policy involved in the coal strike and in the action of the Government against the miners. We wish now to call attention to certain important questions of law and to the unfortunate situation in which those questions are left.

The two great legal issues of the coal strike are, first, the validity of Judge Anderson's injunction requiring the officers of the United Mine Workers to cancel the order for a walk-out; and, second, the institution by the Government of contempt proceedings against eighty-four of the leaders of the miners on the ground that they had violated the injunction. When the officers of the miners agreed to abide by the injunction issued by Judge Anderson, they announced that they would nevertheless seek to carry the case to a higher tribunal for an opinion as to its validity. It is greatly to be hoped that they have not abandoned this intention, but it is a fair question whether compliance with the injunction has not ended the possibility of effective action.

The more recent effort of the Department of Justice to prosecute certain leaders of the miners for violation of the injunction seems likely to be left even more at loose ends, since the court proceedings have been postponed at the request of the Government and probably will not be resumed. It may be that the Department of Justice has evidence of the violation of Judge Anderson's injunction. In view of what has happened in the last two and a half years, however, it is equally possible that the Government began the action as a means of coercing labor, without any adequate evidence to justify prosecution. One assertion, at least, bearing on that point should not go unchallenged. Mr. Dan W. Simms, special attorney for the Department of Justice, was quoted as saying that "refusal to return to work, if a miner knows of the injunction and the subsequent order of the union officials rescinding the strike order, constitutes violation of the injunction, and the Government will proceed on this theory, regardless of whether officers are guilty of some specific act of encouragement of the strike." It may be said unequivocally that such a conception is unknown in either the theory or the practice of the law. Nothing is better settled than that an injunction cannot compel personal

service; nothing is more certain than that no miner or group of miners can be compelled to go to work on a court order. In usage the injunction is negative in character. It forbids rather than requires persons to perform certain acts. In ordering the miners' officers to withdraw the strike order, Judge Anderson gave to his injunction a positive character that surprised many lawyers, but his action could be explained on the ground that it was only part of a general negative order. Where a person makes an individual contract to perform a service, and breaks it, his employer can bring a civil suit for damages. In the case of the coal miners, however, even this possibility did not exist, as theirs was a general union contract which did not prevent any individual from stopping work when he pleased.

So far as the validity of Judge Anderson's injunction is concerned, it may be admitted that the Government had the right, on purely legal grounds, to invoke the Lever law in the coal strike, but there is good authority for questioning whether an injunction was the proper remedy. It is probably a violation of the Lever law to conspire to limit the production of coal, so long as the war is technically going on, but the act provides its own remedy in a clause which makes the violation of the act a crime, punishable by fine and imprisonment. Unlike the Sherman Anti-Trust law, there is no provision in the Lever law for relief by injunction. Ordinarily, therefore, such relief would not be given by the courts unless the violation of the law could be shown to have some other aspect than that of a crime. Now the purpose of an injunction is not to deal with crime, but to prevent irreparable injury to property. Here the Government case rested on shaky foundations. The Government contended that through lack of coal its operation of the railways would be interfered with and that a money loss would result. Obviously, however, that would be only an incidental and indirect result of a strike; there would not necessarily be any direct physical interference with the operation of trains. If a large group of shippers should decide to use automobile trucks instead of railway freight cars, it is evident that the Government would suffer a loss in railway revenue, but it is equally certain that no court would enjoin the shippers on that account.

In any case, the Indianapolis injunction against the coal miners raised grave doubts in the minds of lawyers and the public which the enjoined officials ought to have resolved at once. A quick and sure way of doing so is suggested by the case *in re Sawyer* (124 U. S. 200), involving an attempt on the part of the City Council of Lincoln, Nebraska, in 1887, to remove a police judge from office. The latter obtained an injunction from the United States Circuit Court forbidding such action. The City Council nevertheless removed the police judge, whereupon the Mayor and eleven councilmen were committed to jail by the court for contempt. Their counsel took the case to the United States Supreme Court on *habeas corpus* proceedings, the action of the lower court was declared void, and the prisoners were ordered to be discharged. The decision is cited only to show how the validity of an injunction might be tested in a case such as that of the officers of the United Mine Workers. Unfortunately, the procedure which was followed in the Nebraska case is no longer open to the miners; but if there is any other way in which they may act, they owe it to their organization and to the public to adopt it, regardless of the outcome of the coal strike.

Now for Woman Suffrage

IT was a wise as well as a politic move for the Republican National Committee to urge, as it did at its meeting at Washington last week, that in all States in which the Republican party is in control special sessions of the Legislatures be called, if necessary, in order to ratify the pending woman suffrage amendment to the Federal Constitution before February 1. Perhaps the advice was animated quite as much by a desire to catch votes as by any deep purpose to do justice to the political claims of women, but the advice was sound nevertheless. We heartily endorse it, only with an emendation extending it to States under Democratic control as well. After years of agitation, the question of Federal suffrage for women is at last before the country in the form of a specific proposal, requiring only the affirmative action of the State Legislatures to give it effect. It is neither a party nor a sectional question, but a national one. There should be no unnecessary delay in giving to women the victory for which they have fought and the justice which is their due.

Since the submission of the proposed amendment by Congress last spring, twenty-two States have ratified it. The States, in the order of their ratification, are Wisconsin, Michigan, Kansas, Ohio, New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Texas, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Montana, Nebraska, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Utah, California, Maine, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Colorado. Wisconsin ratified on June 10, Colorado on December 12. In seven States the action of the Legislature was unanimous, and in all the others the majorities were large. That the course which the Republican National Committee recommended is not unprecedented is shown by the fact that eighteen of the twenty-two States which have ratified the amendment did so at special sessions, fourteen of which were called solely for that purpose.

In order to obtain the three-fourths' majority which the Constitution requires, fourteen additional States must give their approval. Suffragists have set February 1 as the date on which they hope to see ratification completed, chiefly in order that women voters may take part in the primaries and conventions which will begin soon after that date in preparation for the Presidential contest. It is expected that the amendment will be accepted in January at the regular Legislative sessions in New Jersey, Maryland, Kentucky, and Rhode Island. Of the ten special sessions which will be necessary, the National Woman's party is hoping that seven will be in Wyoming, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, and Oklahoma. In these States there is already full suffrage for women, but the Governors have thus far declined to call special sessions of the Legislatures to ratify the amendment. As five of the Governors are Republicans, the advice of the Republican National Committee is counted upon to help them change their minds.

One still hears it urged, even by advocates of suffrage for women, that the question is one which each State should have been left to decide for itself; while there are many who believe that the procedure would have been more democratic if the question had been submitted to a special convention in each State, thereby getting a direct and specific mandate from the people. Failure to seek the suffrage through State action alone has given color to the criticism that the advocates of suffrage were unwilling to submit the

issue to popular vote. The reply to such objection has been that public sentiment has already sanctioned woman suffrage and that the shortest and least expensive procedure which would secure suffrage as a Federal right was the best. The question of procedure is no longer, apparently, of practical importance, but in their assumption that public opinion has approved of suffrage for women we believe the suffragists are in the right. The change is inevitable, but it is more than that; it is democratic and it is just. What was once a subject for argument is no longer within the field of controversy. Political leaders throughout the country are ranging themselves in support of the amendment, some of them, no doubt, for the slight credit which they may get from advocating it, but far the larger number, we suspect, because they realize that intelligent public opinion is behind it. The argument that special sessions of State Legislatures entail unnecessary expense is not impressive and should have no weight. The question now is not how the desired result should be obtained, but how soon it can be accomplished. That American women have at last achieved the conquest of public opinion is not only a tribute to the energy and skill with which they have carried on their campaign, but a conclusive reason also why they should be allowed without unnecessary delay to enter into the fruits of their labors. We earnestly hope that the Governors of the States in which special Legislative sessions will be necessary, and in which the rejection of the amendment is not a foregone conclusion, will not misread the signs of the times in this important matter. We are persuaded that the people wish to have the suffrage amendment ratified not grudgingly, but cheerfully and forthwith.

The Voice of the Churches

ONE thinks of the church as by nature conservative. Its creed, if it has one, ordinarily embodies convictions in matters of faith and practice which have grown out of years, perhaps generations or even centuries, of introspection and experience. Its forms of worship, once adopted, come in time to seem a wellnigh inseparable part of faith itself, and are not likely to be much changed without long discussion or even struggle. So far as the church concerns itself with current matters of politics or social welfare, it is prone to stand, albeit negatively quite as often as positively, for the existing order. More often than not it has been the implied supporter of a reactionary or oppressive government or the passive handmaid of an outgrown social system, not because it was convinced that the government was worthy or the system sound, but rather because it disliked and dreaded change. When, accordingly, some important branch of the church strikes out on new lines, and seeks to translate its principles of religious faith and conduct into a practical program of industrial or political action, one must admit that the demand for social change has cut wide and deep.

Some months ago a writer in *The Nation* discussed at length the remarkable program of social and industrial reconstruction made public at Chicago by a group of Roman Catholic bishops. Within a few days the social service division of the Presbyterian New Era movement has urged the members of that church to establish personal relations not only with groups of employers and employees, boards of education, and organizations or groups having to do

with politics, recreation, the press, or public health, but also with "the disturbing group of those who incite violence and lawlessness." The General Assembly of the Presbyterian church has already adopted a social program which calls, among other things, for a more equitable distribution of wealth, the abatement of poverty, the abolition of child labor, the regulation of industrial employment for women, the release of every worker from work one day in seven, conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes, and "the development of a Christian spirit in the attitude of society toward offenders against the law." All these are generalizations, of course; but, as Dr. John McDowell, director of the social service division, said in a recent interview: "It is not the office of the church to determine the form of social organization. It is its work to influence the spirit of it."

The Methodist Episcopal church is more specific. Last May the Board of Bishops of that church, in a letter to the clergy, declared in favor of "an equitable wage for laborers, which shall have the right of way over rent, interest, and profits"; "collective bargaining as an instrument for the attainment of industrial justice and for training in democratic procedure"; and the "advance of the workers themselves through profit-sharing and through positions on boards of directorship." The Federal Council of Churches, representing a membership constituency of some 23,000,000, put itself on record later as favoring industrial councils and shop committees; a living wage which should be "the first charge upon industry before dividends are considered"; heavier taxes for the rich than for the poor; economic independence for woman in the home, together with "the control of her own person," and, in her work, "professional standing equal to that of men"; and for colored persons, "parks and playgrounds, equal wages for equal work, adequate and efficient schools, equal facilities and courtesy when travelling, adequate housing, lighting, and sanitation, police protection, and equality before the law." A commission of the American Unitarian Association has just issued a statement "in regard to the social duty of Christian churches in these times of industrial unrest and critical decisions."

Whom and what do the churches of this country represent? There are in the United States, according to the Federal Council of Churches, approximately 135,000 priests, ministers, or rabbis in charge of congregations. The number of communicants is about 42,000,000. In the Protestant churches alone there are 115,000 ministers and 25,000,000 communicants. In addition to clergy and communicants there are some hundreds of religious newspapers and publishing houses, other hundreds of colleges, universities, and schools, and an imposing array of hospitals, asylums, and other institutions for the relief of distress or the enhancement of social welfare. Here, clearly, is a vast social force which, too often latent thus far, is apparently upon the point of rousing itself. It would be hard to over-estimate the impetus which would be given to any project of industrial or political reform if such powerful bodies as the Roman Catholics, the Methodists, and the Presbyterians were to unite in support of it. Can the churches agree, and can they unite? Can they attack the admitted evils of industrial and political life with the energy which they have shown in proselyting for the faith? Can they sink their sectarian rivalries in a common effort for the realization of that kingdom of righteousness among men for whose coming they all regularly pray? If they can, the forces of evil will have a foe to be reckoned with.

An International Saint

THE little Jews and Japanese who annually salute Santa Claus on the streets of New York and are infected with the spirit of his season do not guess how international is the personage whom they thus honor. Thoroughly established in New York, the ruddy saint is still, like New York itself, compounded of many elements. He was originally, according to the legend, a Christian bishop of Myra in Asia Minor and was persecuted by Diocletian; in the eleventh century his cult, having taken root in Italy, rapidly spread over Western Europe; he was the most popular of mediæval saints; he became the patron saint of Russia and had nearly four hundred churches dedicated to him in England alone. From the Netherlands he proceeded to the New World, where tradition says it was to him that the first Dutch church was dedicated. His day, December 6, one of the five feast days of the New Amsterdam year, was the particular concern of the children. After the colony of New Netherland became New York, the Dutch children's festival gradually merged with the Christmas which Dutch and English alike celebrated. The later of the two dates eclipsed the other, but St. Nicholas, his name Americanized from St. Nicolaes or San Claas to Santa Claus, presided over the double feast. In the earlier days he came riding the great horse, descended from Odin's Sleipner, which he rides to this day in Holland; but at some time undetermined he exchanged his horse for a sleigh or wagon drawn by the reindeer now associated with his legend. From the first he brought gifts for good children, who once set out their shoes to receive his favors, but afterwards hung up their stockings instead—a custom, according to Brand, formerly observed in certain French and Italian convents. All these diverse substances were given a sort of classic form in 1823, in Clement C. Moore's tiny nursery epic "A Visit from St. Nicholas." Since then the saint has shown himself able to assimilate still further material, the Christmas tree of the German-Americans, for instance, from which he will next week distribute millions of presents in thousands of churches. So pervasive is his cult, so innocent of any offense, that the strictest sects in America each year yield something to the patron saint of children.

In the Middle Ages not only children claimed his special protection, but also all those who shrank a little from appealing to so brilliant and busy a patron as St. George. St. Nicholas was the patron saint of laborers, of sailors, of travelling merchants, of travellers generally in the hour of need, of prisoners, slaves, scholars, orphans; the champion of the feeble against the strong, of the poor against the rich, of the oppressed against their oppressors. As such he drew the prayers of the great international community of those who grieve. He became so renowned as a bringer of gifts that when the Reformation banished most of the saints he was allowed to stay behind, still working his annual miracle of generosity. The children kept him, in spite of the protests of reformers, as the darling of the old hagiarchy. In the United States he is the only saint, outside of the Roman communion, who survives at all. On a Christmas which sees us still staggering under colossal burdens, it is refreshing to remember how sturdily and for how many years the imagination of a large part of mankind has clung to a saint who is the very symbol and essence of good will.

The End of Boston's Police Strike

By ARTHUR WARNER

WITH the appearance on the streets of Boston last week of a newly recruited police force of 1,200 men, the rest of the country will be disposed to regard the strike of September as a closed incident, and forget it. Boston will not so easily forget an event that led to the patrol of its streets for three months by armed soldiers, that became the chief issue of the recent gubernatorial campaign, and that brought the class struggle nearer to the front doorsteps of Beacon Hill and Back Bay than it had ever come before. When I visited the city, nearly two months after the walk-out, I found that partisanship and rancor had permeated almost every circle, even to Harvard University, the president of which had offered 1,000 students (who fortunately never appeared) to take the place of absent police, while one of the lecturers had addressed a gathering of policemen's wives so sympathetically that a number of graduates were demanding, under pain of not contributing to the endowment fund, that his mouth be stopped.

The public should not dismiss from mind the Boston police strike without getting straight certain facts that have finally emerged from the mixture of prejudice, misrepresentation, and truth that constituted our first knowledge of the event. Nor should it be overlooked that the striking policemen won better conditions—for their successors and for their fellows in other cities. The pay of the Boston police has been advanced from \$1,100 to \$1,400 for the first year, plus a free uniform not previously given, and other causes of dissatisfaction are, or soon will be, remedied. Especially to be remembered, as the police strike passes into history, are these facts:

First, a citizens' committee, representing the solid business interests of Boston, reached an agreement with the counsel of the police (including withdrawal from the American Federation of Labor) that would have prevented the strike, but the Police Commissioner rejected the plan and made a walkout inevitable by dropping the officers of the Policemen's Union from the force.

Second, riot and disorder were needlessly permitted, if not encouraged, during the night after the walkout (thus deflecting public opinion definitely against the police), not only by the refusal of the Police Commissioner to call for militia, although advised to do so by the citizens' committee and the Mayor, but also by the failure of the Police Commissioner to use volunteers already mobilized, or even adequately employ the policemen remaining at work.

Many of these facts were not known at the time of the strike, when public opinion in the United States was molded through the press dispatches, and have not yet been fairly explained outside of Boston. Even there they are known only to persons who have taken the trouble to read in detail the statement of the citizens' committee, appointed by Mayor Peters and headed by James J. Storrow, which was printed in the Boston newspapers of October 4, after pressure by organized labor and nearly a month after the policemen walked out. Except for certain conclusions, inserted between the first and second drafts and since challenged by the counsel for the policemen, the report of the Storrow committee is accepted by all parties as a fair and accurate history. Yet outside of Boston it either received no attention

by the press or was treated in a hopelessly perfunctory way. *The New York Times* gave it half a column, sent by the Associated Press, of which all but a nine-line paragraph at the end consisted of the conclusions to which the counsel for the police later objected.

For many years the American Federation of Labor refused to let policemen organize under its jurisdiction, but at the convention in Atlantic City last spring the way was opened, and unionization began in a score of cities. In a number of cases official objection followed, and in a few instances the policemen abandoned their efforts; in others, they stood their ground, and their action was accepted, somewhat doubtfully, as inevitable. In Boston alone the issue caused a serious upheaval. It is everywhere admitted now that the policemen there had legitimate and serious grievances in respect to pay, hours, and working conditions. The Police Department of Boston is not a part of the city administration, although the latter pays for its maintenance. The Commissioner is appointed by the Governor of the State and is removable by him, but apparently is intended to stand a little apart from his administration, since the Commissioner is appointed for a term of years and the Governor is elected for only one. Edwin U. Curtis, the present Commissioner, was appointed by ex-Governor McCall, although he took office almost simultaneously with the present Governor, Calvin Coolidge. When the affiliation of the police with the American Federation of Labor (the Boston firemen and other civil servants were already in) was broached last summer, the Commissioner voiced his opposition, but did not undertake to forbid such action until organization had been effected and some 1,100 out of the city's 1,500 policemen had signed as charter members. Then he promulgated the following rule:

No member of the force shall join or belong to any organization, club, or body composed of present or present and past members of the force, which is affiliated with or part of any organization, club, or body outside the Department, except that a post of the Grand Army of the Republic, the United States Spanish War Veterans, and the American Legion of World's War Veterans may be formed within the Department.

As one of the counsel for the policemen later pointed out, this rule would have prevented a member of the Department from belonging to the Methodist Church. The rule also appears to run counter to a State statute (Revised Laws of Massachusetts, chapter 106, section 12) which says: "No person shall, himself or by his agent, coerce or compel a person into a written or verbal agreement not to join or become a member of a labor organization as a condition of his securing employment or continuing in the employment of such person." This law has been declared invalid by a Federal court in so far as it affects the United States Government as an employer, but it is apparently still in force with respect to other persons.

The policemen went ahead and elected officers; whereupon Mr. Curtis countered by ordering nineteen of them before him for trial—the seventeen officers and two others that had been included as such by mistake on stool-pigeon evidence. He announced that he would render decision at a later date.

This was the puzzling and by no means one-sided situa-

tion that confronted the city of Boston when on August 27 Mayor Peters, although without jurisdiction over the Police Department, appointed a committee of thirty-four men to find, if possible, a way out of the dilemma. Although spoken of as a "citizens' committee," the membership was made up overwhelmingly of substantial, well-connected business men—such a body as the Chamber of Commerce itself might have appointed. It may be inferred, therefore, that the committee had no bias in favor of the policemen. Quite the contrary. Its chairman, Mr. Storrow, made this abundantly evident by issuing a personal statement before the committee had even met to the effect that the policemen should not affiliate with the American Federation of Labor. When the committee met the next day it adopted unanimously a resolution in the same sense.

It should be noted here that while Mayor Peters and Mr. Storrow are Democrats and Commissioner Curtis is a Republican, an apparently honest effort was made to eliminate party politics. Before the appointment of the committee was announced, Mr. Storrow communicated through a friend with Mr. Curtis to learn if he would approve of efforts by such a committee and if the proposed chairman would be agreeable. He received favorable assurances on both points, and Mr. Storrow's preliminary statement against affiliation with the American Federation of Labor was seen and informally approved by the Police Commissioner. On Labor Day, September 1, a sub-committee of the main body had a friendly conference with Commissioner Curtis, the latter coming to Boston from his summer home at Nahant for the purpose.

It was understood that Commissioner Curtis would render his decision in connection with the nineteen policemen under charges on Thursday, September 4. The Storrow committee realized that if the finding were adverse to the men the work of reconciliation would become impossible, and hence sought on the day previous to obtain a postponement of the decision. But in the meanwhile Mr. Curtis had come under the advice of Herbert Parker, a corporation lawyer, whom he had retained as his personal counsel. Mr. Parker was at one time Attorney General of the State, and is spoken of in Massachusetts as counsel for the Beef Trust and the Standard Oil interests. He has also been alluded to as representing indirectly the United States Steel Corporation. He was a member of the committee on initiative and referendum at the recent constitutional convention in Massachusetts and signed the minority report against adopting those devices. He is reputed to have been the sponsor in the Legislature for the "secret police" bill, which was exposed by the Harvard Liberal Club and beaten, and also the backer of the anti-anarchy bill, which went through. The character of the latter may be inferred from a colloquy that took place in one of Boston's most genteel clubs at which the floor leader for the proposed legislation was present. Said one of the club members, pulling a radical publication from his pocket, "Why, they could put me in jail merely for having this in my possession." "Oh, the law isn't intended for you, Bob," replied the floor leader suavely. "It's so we can clap those roughnecks down in Lawrence in jail." (The Lawrence mill strike was in progress at the time.)

Further light on Mr. Parker may be gleaned from the fact that although the Chamber of Commerce had urged Commissioner Curtis to employ personal counsel, yet on learning of his choice it sent a committee to him to suggest a change. According to a statement subsequently made by James H. Vahey and John P. Feeney, counsel for the Police-

men's Union, "some of the members of the Mayor's executive committee, the counsel for the policemen, and Chairman Macomber of the Chamber of Commerce were fearful of the influence of Mr. Parker, not upon questions of law, *but upon the policy of the Police Commissioner.*" (The italics are mine.)

But let us return to the Mayor's committee and its attempt on September 3 to obtain postponement of the decision in the case of the nineteen policemen, due to be announced the next morning. A letter requesting postponement was presented at the office of the Police Commissioner by a member of the committee. The result is briefly but suggestively recounted in the report of the Storrow committee: "No action was taken in response nor reply received to this letter, because counsel (Herbert Parker) for the Commissioner, who received and read the letter, declined to permit its delivery to the Commissioner."

In the evening of the same day (September 3) a new figure entered the controversy, or rather was brought in by the citizens' committee. Governor Coolidge, although vested by law with the appointment and removal of the Police Commissioner, and thus apparently responsible for his acts, had so far studiously avoided the issue. When appealed to by representatives of the citizens' committee on the evening in question he continued to avoid it, saying that he felt it was not his duty to communicate with the Commissioner on the subject. Mayor Peters came to the rescue, however, by sending a letter to the Police Commissioner next morning, under which pressure it was announced that the decision would be postponed for four days—until Monday, September 8.

The Storrow committee continued its work, and on Saturday, September 6, had evolved a plan acceptable to it and the counsel for the Policemen's Union. The first clause of the agreement provided that the policemen should surrender their charter in the American Federation of Labor. Other clauses provided for the protection of the leaders of the unionization movement and for the consideration of wages and other grievances by arbitrators, the latter to have, however, only recommendatory powers. The plan was formally submitted to Commissioner Curtis on Sunday morning, September 7, but no answer was received from him in the course of the day. As the committee knew that the decision against the nineteen policemen, if made the next morning, would precipitate a strike, it gave the plan to the press that night, and the proposals received the editorial approval of every daily newspaper in Boston on Monday, with one exception. In regard to the attitude of the policemen toward the plan the Storrow report says:

The executive committee . . . was already of the opinion that on Sunday the plan was on the point of being approved by their (the policemen's) officials, and that it would also be approved at a general meeting of the men. The opinion of your committee in this regard was also confirmed by the fact that the counsel for the Police Union, Messrs. Vahey and Feeney, both unqualifiedly advised the officials to accept it, and also undertook to attend the general meeting of all the members of the Police Union and there unqualifiedly advise the men to accept it. Such a meeting could and would have been held probably on Monday afternoon, September 8, but instead of considering your committee's plan on Monday afternoon, the men as the result of the Commissioner's finding of that morning (following his earlier declination to consider the plan) thereupon entered upon the business of taking a strike vote.

At this point, or just before, Governor Coolidge was again sought by the citizens' committee. On Sunday an

effort was made to obtain a conference with him, but the executive who later made such boast of preserving "law and order" by a flourish of musketry was "reported to be in the western part of the State" when action was needed to avert the crisis that threatened Boston on the morrow. Finally, on Monday evening—after Commissioner Curtis had given decision against the policemen and the fat was in the fire—the citizens' committee succeeded in having a talk with the Governor. It was suggested that he might yet save the situation, but in lieu of such action he was urged to have troops ready to patrol Boston at 5:45 P. M. the next day, the hour set for the police walkout.

The next afternoon Mayor Peters visited Commissioner Curtis to suggest the wisdom of asking to have the State Guard in readiness, but was assured that ample means were at hand to protect the city. Even the volunteer police, who began to inquire if they were not wanted, were told that they would not be called upon until the next day. At 5:45 P. M. Tuesday, September 9, the 1,100 union policemen walked out. The men did not, as many persons were led to believe by the newspaper dispatches, strike for more pay and better working conditions. They went out because nineteen of their number had been dropped from duty for doing the same thing that all of them had done. Right or wrong, they were actuated by loyalty rather than selfishness, and were carrying to its logical conclusion the Commissioner's action in disciplining nineteen of them. Viewed in this light, the action was as much a lockout by Mr. Curtis as a strike by the men. That night there was disorder and some robbery and rioting, and the next morning Mayor Peters, acting under a law that gave him power after rioting had actually occurred, took control of the Police Department, called out the State Guard located in Boston, and, presto, order was restored.

Enter again the Governor. Having made no effort to prevent the strike when opportunity offered, and having refused requests to protect Boston in advance from disorder, he now notes that the mischief has been done and public sentiment has been turned violently and almost unanimously against the policemen. He accedes at last to the Mayor's request to call out the State Guard from elsewhere in Massachusetts, and, assuming command after order has been restored, he puffs out his chest and proclaims "What a good boy am I!" The words of the Storrow committee on this point are a model of restraint and yet of illumination: "By Thursday morning order had been generally restored in the city. On Thursday afternoon the Governor assumed control of the situation."

One takes leave of the Boston police strike feeling not so much that injustice was done the men as that the city was the victim of a miscarriage of the normal processes of democracy, and that the public interest was flouted by three personally insignificant men—a Police Commissioner, a lawyer, and a Governor of Massachusetts. One need not consider here the right or expediency of the affiliation of the policemen with the American Federation of Labor. That is something for the whole country to solve gradually through deliberation and experiment. Boston alone cannot settle it, much less a single Police Commissioner by personal fiat. One may admit that the police were wrong in quitting their jobs, although assured that order could be maintained without them, and acting from a motive of loyalty to their fellows to which nine out of ten Americans would have responded similarly. The facts remain that the strike had been settled the Saturday before by an agree-

ment between the Mayor's committee and the counsel for the police; that the Police Commissioner was at first friendly to the work of the Mayor's committee, but ended by needlessly forcing the police out in spite of their wish and that of the public to the contrary; that both the Police Commissioner and the Governor were urged to take advance precautions against disorder, but that nothing was done, even to the proper use of the police remaining on duty; that Boston was needlessly given over to a night of disorder, which was only stopped next day by the Mayor's exercise of the power given him by law in the presence of actual riot to take control of the Police Department and call out the State militia within the limits of the city.

What explanation is there of the amazing attitude of Messrs. Curtis, Parker, and Coolidge? If Mr. Curtis had acted alone, one might attribute his course to wilfulness, vanity, or ignorance. Acting, as he did, on advice of counsel, this seems less likely. It is possible that Messrs. Curtis and Coolidge, as Republicans, were playing for partisan political advantage against Mayor Peters and the head of his committee, Mr. Storrow, both Democrats. But the game was so dangerous and uncertain from that standpoint that hardly any one but a god or a devil would have essayed it. Messrs. Curtis and Coolidge have not the distinction of being either.

Certain persons in Boston, looking behind the superficial record for an explanation of this strike that was forced upon the policemen against their wishes and the almost unanimous sentiment of the city, see the hand of Big Business, grasping at a chance to discredit organized labor with the public and so make it easier to defeat union demands looming up elsewhere in the country.

"A police strike would be the most unpopular of any that union workmen could support. If we can force them to defend such an issue, we can give them a black eye that will weaken them all over the United States. Why not fight the steel strike in Massachusetts instead of Pennsylvania? Why not make Boston the Belgium of our struggle?" In some such words as these one can imagine certain national captains of industry discussing the tactical possibilities of the Boston police situation in the latter part of August and the early days of September. Indeed there is a man in a confidential business position in Boston who says that letters conveying such ideas were received by certain influential persons in the city from a high official of the United States Steel Corporation. There is an incident worth telling, too, in this connection, centring around the long-standing feud between two well-known Boston banking houses. It has been customary for each to have a representative on any committee like that to settle the policemen's troubles, but in this instance, apparently by accident, one of them was forgotten. On the day before the walkout a friend went to see a member of the latter firm, who is also a director of the United States Steel Corporation, and was told "Why, Bob is out settling the police strike."

It may be that those persons in Boston who consider national industrial interests responsible for the police strike are right. It may be that the explanation of this otherwise almost inexplicable sequence of events is that, consciously or unconsciously, Messrs. Curtis, Parker, and Coolidge were serving the purpose of Big Business—led by Mr. Gary and the Steel Trust—in its effort to perpetuate a decadent and despotic industrialism by discrediting the rising power of organized labor.

The Nation and the Printers' League

IN *The Nation* of November 8 there was published a brief statement of the position taken by The Nation Press in reference to the printers' strike, together with the essential parts of a letter addressed by The Nation Press to the Printers' League. On November 18 representatives of The Nation Press appeared before the Executive Committee of the League, and were informed that a reply to that letter had been sent, which proved not to be the case. On the next morning the information appeared in the newspapers that The Nation Press had been expelled from the League. On November 25 the League notified The Nation Press of the action officially taken a week earlier. Under date of November 19 the Special Committee of the League addressed to the editors of *The Nation* the following letter, with a request for its publication. (Bracketed numbers apply to our reply to the allegations of the letter; our position will be made most clear if the reader will at each number refer to the corresponding note following the letter.)

LETTER OF THE PRINTERS' LEAGUE

EDITORS OF THE NATION:

The Printers' League Committee has considered carefully your letter of November 5th, . . . You state: "During the past month we have carried on extensive investigations into the causes and the history of the present unhappy struggle. In view of the representations and promises, express and implied, that were held out by representatives of the League, both unofficial and official, as far back as March, 1919, we have become thoroughly satisfied that the men and their leaders had substantial reason for expecting the 44-hour week and an increase of pay on October 1, 1919. To us this seems the basic moral fact as regards our contract obligations to our employees, irrespective of the intrigues and the tricky conduct that have taken place on the part of employers and both factions of employees." Again, later on, you state: "We are absolutely opposed to the use of arbitration as a war cry to prevent men from obtaining a prompt settlement of demands based upon earlier promises."

As far as the committee can learn, no effort was made on your part to secure reference to the minutes of the meetings of the unions and the Committee on April 2 and 4, 1919, to check the accuracy of the information secured by you. To make the sweeping statement you have and to charge insincerity without at least checking the records, would hardly seem to an impartial investigator to be fair, thorough, or conclusive. . . . you could not only have had access to them [the minutes] but every opportunity to interview the Committee, either as a body or individually. Nothing of this kind was done, and you have apparently satisfied yourself with an *ex parte* statement of the case. It is difficult to discuss the merits of the case when you have approached the securing of the evidence with so partisan a spirit. [See note 1.]

Under the circumstances, however, a statement of the Committee's position seems necessary in order to refute the charge of bad faith which you have made and published.

The War Labor Board in its decision of October, 1918, made provision for a reopening of the case on May 1, 1919, for such an adjustment as changed conditions rendered necessary. Accordingly, conferences were held between representatives of the Allied Printing Trades Unions and the Printers' League Committee on April 2 and 4, looking forward to an adjustment on May 1, 1919. Three important matters came up for consideration at that time:

(a)—Increase, if any, in the cost of living.

(b)—Adoption of plan similar to that of the photo-engravers, which provides that union reserves the right to refuse to allow

its men to work for any concern which charges less than a selling price fixed by the union.

(c)—Introduction of the 44-hour week.

Taking these up in their turn and showing action of Committee:

(a)—The increase in the cost of living was not considered sufficient to justify a readjustment of wages on May 1, and it was mutually agreed to let the same scale remain in effect until October 1, when all of the contracts expired and an adjustment could then be made. The Committee frankly stated that they anticipated granting an increase in wages on October 1. This promise has been redeemed, though there is controversy over the amount of the increase. No definite amount was promised. Arbitration has been offered to settle this dispute.

(b)—Photo-engravers' plan: The Committee told the unions this could not be entered into unless the unions forced it, as they did in the case of the engravers, because such action would be construed as a violation of the anti-trust laws. A willingness was expressed that if some legal way could be found to carry out the purpose the unions had in mind, the employers would not oppose it. No agreement was reached, nor was any promise of any kind made regarding the plan. Some of the unions later on condemned the plan. No violation of promise, verbal, implied or otherwise in this. [See note 2.]

(c)—Definite notice was served by the unions that it was their intention to introduce the 44-hour week on October 1, 1919. The Committee stated clearly that they had no objection to October 1 or any other date, provided the 44-hour week went into effect nationally, and that they would endeavor to have it agreed upon nationally. [See note 3.] Through the International Joint Conference made up of the nationally elected representatives of the Allied Printing Trades Unions and the employers' associations—including the International Presidents of the Typographical Union, the Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union, the Stereotypers and Electrotypers Union, and the Brotherhood of Bookbinders for the employees, and the closed shop branch of the United Typothetae of America, the Printers' League of America, Association of Electrotypers, and Association of Bookbinders—a resolution was endorsed on April 21 to submit to referendum vote of the constituent bodies of the Council the question of the introduction of the 44-hour week. This was the only organization dealing jointly with the national problems of the industry. A referendum vote was taken for May 1, 1921, among the locals and passed by a large majority. [See note 4.] The date was chosen because of existing contracts and to give the industry time to prepare itself for the change so that conflicts throughout the country could be avoided. The Committee is at a loss to understand upon what basis any statement has been made that there had been a promise other than to agree to put the 44-hour week into effect when it was done nationally. This promise has been fully carried out.

The Committee denies that there has been any breach of faith concerning any promise, verbal or written, official or unofficial, and considers that if it is your desire to verify these statements, you can from the records. [See note 5.]

When you signed the pledge to support the position taken by the Committee, the issues involved in the controversy were clearly outlined as those stated in your letter, viz: (1) sanctity of contracts; (2) International unionism as opposed to irresponsible unionism; (3) arbitration of disputes that cannot otherwise be adjusted. To these principles you subscribed. You now state that as inter-union disputes made it impossible for you to operate, you endorsed the position of the Committee. At that time you believed that the desire of the Committee for a fair and equitable settlement was the same desire as that by which you were animated. Was your endorsement at that time merely a matter of expediency? [See note 6.]

There is no difference of opinion on the question of the necessity of having contracts fairly made and faithfully kept. There may be an honest difference of opinion as to whether or not the reestablishment of the control of the Internationals may or may not make for the greater degree of responsibility on the part of the locals to carry out their agreements. . . . The Committee believes that there is a greater promise of national stability and constructive progress for the whole industry in the positive recognition of the principle of national control

than there is in that of local autonomy carried to the point of irresponsibility and finding expression in direct catastrophic action to secure adjustments of disputes even though every opportunity is offered for fair arbitration. . . .

Your position on arbitration as a process for the settlement of disputes where conciliation fails is not directly stated. Because of decisions which may not have pleased all parties in the past, and because you conclude on an *ex parte* statement that some promises of the Committee have not been redeemed, you are opposed to arbitration in this case. . . . Are you not taking a directly partisan view in regard to the arbitration decisions which have been made in the printing trades in New York city in the past? Reference is made in this connection to the arbitration awards made by the late John Mitchell in the case of the newspapers and followed by that of Frank Morrison in April of this year; that of John Fitch of *The Survey* in the case of the Job Press Feeders; and those of the War Labor Board. You are no doubt familiar with these decisions. They may not have satisfied all parties—such decisions seldom do—however, the arbitrators in the awards cited can hardly be charged with insincerity. Certainly the position you take that arbitration as a process is all right when it favors “my side” of the case is as fallacious on one side as it is on the other. . . . The Committee cannot help but feel that you are not facing the issue of arbitration squarely [See note 7].

The Committee frankly recognizes the urgent necessity for industrial experimentation to secure if possible a character of relation in the future which will eliminate conflicts of the present unfortunate kind and which will make for better coöperation and production. Some plan based essentially upon the same general principles which have been recognized in other industries and which are being adapted and tried out by you [See note 8], it is believed, hold in them possibilities of constructive progress. The Committee feels, however, that any such plan must be built upon the structure of the unions which are affiliated with their Internationals, and that at this time the issues for which the Committee has stood must be settled before other matters can be taken up.

In conclusion, if your action to withdraw your pledge had been based on your fundamental belief that the locals should be left to settle their own differences and that no action should be taken to limit that right, the Committee could at least have respected your decision even though they disagreed with you. But when you subscribed to support the principles underlying the issues involved and now attempt to justify your withdrawal by charging insincerity on the part of the Committee, based upon evidence collected, analyzed, and interpreted in a purely partisan spirit, the Committee cannot help but feel that you are repudiating the principles to which you subscribed, and that your present action is one of pure expediency [See note 9].

(Signed) SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF FIVE
PRINTERS' LEAGUE SECTION
ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYING PRINTERS

REPLY OF THE NATION

(1) Copious extracts from the minutes referred to were read to us by the official representative of the Committee, and were discussed with him in the course of a three-hour interview previous to the taking of action by us. These minutes were not a stenographic report, but were prepared by the secretary of the League's Executive Committee from notes taken by him, and were never submitted to the Conference for approval. The union leaders emphatically deny the correctness of the minutes so far as they convey any suggestion that those leaders even contemplated a postponement of the 44-hour week beyond October 1, 1919. We do not suggest bad faith in the preparation of the minutes; we do assert that there may have been no meeting of minds concerning that issue, and that records prepared by one side and never submitted to the other side for approval

afford imperfect evidence of what actually occurred. All this, however, is secondary.

The following facts are fundamental. According to the uncontradicted testimony of a member of the League's Executive Committee (supported by the unanimous testimony of union leaders), during weeks preceding April 2 members of the Executive Committee held a series of individual conferences with those leaders, and assured them that if they allowed May 1 to pass without reopening the case (as they had the right to do at that time), then the employers would adjust the whole matter in friendly fashion before October 1 on the basis of careful study of living costs, prices, and other relevant conditions. They did not seriously oppose the granting of the 44-hour week on October 1, 1919, which certain members of the Committee, indeed, stated was inevitable; in fact, one member assured one of the leaders that the Committee would show the unions “how to get the 44-hour week.” It is generally conceded among those cognizant of these conferences that the unions could on May 1 have obtained almost anything they demanded. Their leaders yielded to the request of members of the Committee not to disturb conditions on May 1 and to their promises of careful study and friendly settlement before October 1. These facts are not to be obscured by references to the subsequent meetings of April 2 and 4. Following April 4 the handling of the whole problem was transferred from the Executive Committee of the League to a Special Committee of Five, and the men who had been most active in the earlier negotiations and who had gone farthest in promises to the union leaders were not included in that Committee. Thereafter the union leaders tried vainly to get a meeting with the Committee, in accordance with the earlier pledges of study and adjustment. Not until August did they succeed in obtaining any conference, and then not at all in the promised spirit of conciliation.

(2) By means of the so-called “photo-engravers' plan” employers can throw on the unions responsibility for fixing a selling price, thus escaping the operation of the Anti-Trust law. So far from being “the purpose the unions had in mind,” the device was suggested and repeatedly urged upon the union leaders by a member of the Executive Committee of the Printers' League.

(3) The union leaders unanimously declare that they never at any time agreed to defer the 44-hour week until such time as it could be obtained nationally. The earlier conferences must not be forgotten.

(4) The referendum was worded as follows, and called for a yes or no vote:

“Resolved, That both parties are to submit to their respective bodies: that, beginning May 1, 1921, the 44-hour week will prevail nationally in the printing industry and that each side recommend the adoption of this resolution to their constituent bodies and report to the next meeting of the International Joint Conference Council.”

The so-called “one-way referendum” is a device well known in union politics. The New York unions were given no chance to express themselves as between May 1, 1921, and October 1, 1919,—the real issue, but only between May, 1921, and—never!

(5) The very point is that the facts cannot possibly be verified from the records, because the fundamental facts were not matters of record.

(6) Our endorsement, like our settlement, was based on a desire to obtain, so far as possible, a fair adjustment of the entire complicated question at issue, as should be apparent from any intelligent reading of our letter.

(7) We did not even suggest insincerity or bias on the part of arbitrators. Our position concerning arbitration is simple: it is practically impossible for an outside arbitrator within reasonable time to master all the intricate details of an industrial controversy like the present one; the side making the more skilful presentation of its case therefore usually gets the better of the award, no matter how fair the arbitrator. It is hard to see

how this position can be interpreted as meaning that arbitration "is all right when it favors 'my side.'" Arbitration is essentially a means of maintaining the *status quo* by preventing the existing relation between employers and employees from passing into a state of open warfare. We believe that relation no longer tenable, and we are beginning in our own shop the experiment of changing it.

(8) So far as we are aware, we are making the first attempt in this country at working out the experiment of industrial self-government through a works council intended to operate at every stage in the closest harmony with the trade unions, and also to include so soon as possible the consumers of the product.

(9) In view of the serious risks of our action and its manifest unpopularity among powerful interests in the world of business and labor alike, we leave to our readers the judgment whether it was based on principle or expediency. We are gratified that it has at any rate been received with respect, if not with entire approval, by many employers, by unions both local and international, and by the public which believes in fair play. What is far more important, the brief experience of six weeks has already furnished striking evidence that the very first steps in taking our employees into partnership on a basis of honest industrial democracy have resulted in a marked increase of production.

EDITOR OF THE NATION.

In taking leave of the Printers' League we cannot forbear expressing our regret that the removal of our name from their stencils will doubtless deprive us of the pleasure of receiving further letters like the following, which has recently reached us. Doubtless we are not alone in our surprise at this evidence of the methods used by the League.

JOHN F. SHEA
FORMER DETECTIVE SERGEANT
N. Y. POLICE DEPARTMENT

FRANK J. FARLEY
FORMERLY WITH
WM. J. BURNS

SHEA AND FARLEY

DETECTIVE BUREAU

1416 Broadway, New York, December, 1919

DEAR SIR: Owing to the labor difficulties which the employing printers of New York have experienced for the past two months, we feel that our names have become quite familiar to the members of the Association.

While we are not inclined to decorate ourselves with bouquets regarding our work, it is with a sense of pride and self-satisfaction that we are pleased to be able to call your attention to the fact that there was no angle of the situation but what we proved capable of being able to handle promptly and efficiently.

The object in writing this letter is to advise you as to the character of our agency. It is a rare thing with us to handle a strike and as a matter of fact it is a side issue, conducted in a separate office, apart from our other business. . . . In view of this we were able to keep the Association advised of what transpired at the Union meetings as well as the gathering of the gossip of those who congregated in the vicinity of shops.

As a corroboration of this statement, we take the liberty of referring you to Mr. Eugene Kelley, Chairman of the Association's Protective Committee during the recent trouble. . . .

Wishing to thank you for your patronage during the recent trouble which has just culminated so triumphantly for you, and hoping for a continuance of our pleasant business relations, we are

Very truly yours,

JOHN F. SHEA

FRANK J. FARLEY

The Blind War

By B. ROUSTAM BEK

WHEN two or more countries are bound by a military alliance, they must act in war as one fighting body in order to attain a definite common end. If only the smallest disagreement arises between the allied armies, the defeat of both is likely. Harmony in action of all technical units, as well as the coöperation and coördination of diplomacy, is an indispensable condition, without which a final victory is impossible. This principle, acknowledged by all strategists, has been verified in the World War.

Unfortunately for the Allies, there was anything but unanimity in the reactionary coalition which undertook armed intervention in Russia. The constant vacillation of Allied diplomacy after the November revolution in 1917 paralyzed the strategy of the military leaders. The Allied Governments looked on these operations as of secondary importance; their attention was concentrated on Bolshevism, but not on the Bolsheviki and their growing military strength. The Allies became so alarmed at the spreading of "Bolshevist" ideas in their respective countries that they began vigorously to fight alleged "Bolshevism" at home, while the Bolsheviki in Russia gained time to organize their strength. There was no attempt at a serious investigation of the political situation in Russia. The interested Governments tried to guess at it, looking through the spectacles of their old-fashioned officials, and consequently they underestimated the revolutionary spirit of the Russian nation. Trotzky was scorned and mocked alike by Russian military refugees and by the British War Office. Even France, a country with revolutionary experiences, refused to believe that Trotzky would ever be able to form a force strong enough

to resist the invasion of Russia by a well-organized counter-revolutionary army supported by all the Great Powers of Europe, America, and Japan.

Instead of organizing a strongly united coalition, the Allies from the first disagreed in regard to the steps to be taken toward Russia and in their respective political aims. France desired to see a strong, united Russia, and a powerful, independent Poland as a buffer state between Russia and Germany; while Great Britain favored the disintegration of the former Russian Empire into several small, powerless states, thus preventing the long-pending menace to India. The Japanese designs upon Siberia created a certain anxiety in America, which hesitated to favor those designs. It was a public secret that at the moment when England was in favor of Japanese intervention in Siberia, the United States opposed it. After long discussion, it was finally decided to create an Allied front in Russia, for the announced purpose of preventing the Bolsheviki from joining with the Germans. Thus the invasion of Russia was undertaken without declaration of war.

A movement of purely strategical character, the war against Russia was begun without a serious reconnaissance, except for information collected from ignorant British agents and business men returned from Russia, as well as from Russian refugees, mostly members of the old régime, who anticipated personal advantage from armed intervention. There was no seriously prepared military plan for this gigantic campaign. The officers and men of the expeditionary forces were not even told whom they were going to fight. In the beginning, it was said that they were going

against the Germans in Russia, and later that their enemy would be the Bolsheviks, who were described by the press as undisciplined bands of cut-throats, murderers, robbers, and looters. A few reasonable men who knew the real situation in Russia tried to draw the attention of the British War Office to the fact that such an invasion of Russia was an impossibility.

The famous Napoleonic doctrine that strategy tolerates no uncertain or half-measures was ignored. Consequently, there was neither strategical intelligence in the Russian adventure nor political determination. The British General Staff was not acquainted either with the topography of Russia, or with the ethnographical and historical characteristics of the country. Russia was less known to the English officers geographically than Sahara.

In normal circumstances, strategy prepares its plans of campaign and selects its objective after being fully informed by the diplomatists about their political aims; and while accomplishing its plan by means of arms, depends upon constant and strong support from diplomacy. During the invasion of Russia the strategy of the Russo-Allied forces was wrecked by the contradictory aims of Allied diplomacy. It will be remembered at how many times and at what important strategical moments the Allies not only declined to recognize Kolchak, but even announced their intention of withdrawing their troops and cutting off Kolchak's supplies.

Waging this blind war against Soviet Russia, the short-sighted Allied politicians for more than a year failed to realize that the Reds had under arms not fewer than two million well-equipped and splendidly drilled men; that there were about one million additional in training; that within two years the Soviet officers' training corps had supplied the army with 40,000 young officers from the working and peasant class. They also ignored the fact that Russian industry, which had been enormously increased during the war with Germany, though insufficient for a population of 180,000,000, could easily supply all the needs of an army of eight millions, without any outside help, and that the inexhaustible resources of raw materials were sufficient for all needs. They exaggerated the significance of the proposed blockade of Russia, forgetting that the army of an agricultural country cannot be starved by blockade, and that the blockade therefore only brings useless sufferings upon the peaceful citizens of the industrial centers. They refused to see that armed intervention and blockade together could do nothing but increase the national spirit of the population, and thus strengthen the party which controlled the Government.

The political situation was mixed in the minds of the Allies in a jumble of uncomprehended terms. Allied statesmen would not understand that the Bolsheviks were a political party, and that they alone were able to save Russia from anarchy and to unite the Soviets in one federated republic. They did not realize that with time the extreme revolutionary aggressiveness of the Bolshevik Government must pass through transformation, and that consequently the Soviets might become a government acceptable to Europe; or that the circumstances of the French Republic, the birth of which met with the same hostility, might be repeated. Exaggeration and "anti-Bolshevik" propaganda by means of the most hideous and stupid lies confused the diplomacy of the Allies, as misinformation concerning the military situation wrecked their strategy. They underestimated, also, the working-class sentiment in their own countries, which on several occasions interfered with their strategical plans

for the supply of munitions and the dispatch of reinforcements. From the military point of view in general, the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia were defeated chiefly because they failed to support one another in time, thanks to the lack of unity among their commanders in the first and most important stage of the campaign.

Kolchak, for instance, having underestimated the real strength and the military value of the Soviet army, started his first offensive much too early. Denikin, on the other hand, was not fully prepared for a general advance, and was thus unable to rescue the army of Kolchak after its débâcle at Perm, west of the Ural Mountains. Similarly, General Judenitch was unable to resume the long-promised attack on Petrograd, because of the hesitation of Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland. This attack should have been started much earlier than it was, and in no case should it have been undertaken at the moment when Kolchak's army, constantly pursued by the enemy, had been pushed back to Omsk and practically annihilated.

Denikin succeeded in penetrating as far north as Orel, and seriously threatened the industrial center of Soviet Russia—the town of Tula. There he was suddenly checked, defeated, and deprived of the initiative. He could not count upon relief from any source. The northern invasion of the Archangel-Murmansk front had already been brought to a standstill and recognized as a failure by the Allies themselves. Denikin's situation henceforth became critical. The Ukrainians suddenly turned against him, thus threatening his rear and left flank, and a serious revolutionary movement began far in his rear, menacing the naval bases through which he was supplied by the Allies. The front which Denikin covers with his army now presents a line of 750 to 800 miles, from Berdichev, southwest of Kiev, on the west, and Tsaritsin, on the Volga, on the east. Three separate columns of Denikin's forces are now retreating in order to avoid encirclement by the advancing enemy. The western column, after fierce fighting for Berdichev, is falling back to the south on the River Bug toward Odessa; the central column, defeated at Orel, is retreating along both sides of the Kursk-Kharkov railway on Kharkov; the eastern column of General Baron Wrangel is still holding the fortified position around Tsaritsin. These three groups maintain communication by means of cavalry Cossacks, which compose half of all Denikin's forces. Winter and bad roads have reduced the value of cavalry by forty per cent. Denikin has no strategical reserves.

The Reds have concentrated against Denikin an army preponderant in men and in artillery, and during the last six weeks have advanced in the center to a depth of about 130 miles. They hold the section of the middle Don to Kachalinskaya (west of Tsaritsin) and have thus entirely separated the forces of Baron Wrangel from the central column. The Reds later captured Romny and Sumi, southwest of Kursk, in the triangle Kiev, Kursk, Kharkov, and after a fierce ten days' battle took Bielgorod, north of Kharkov, moving their divisions from Ostrogojsk on the River Don in a south-westerly direction. It has thus become clear that their main strategical objective in this theatre is Kharkov, which is the key of all South Russia, because it is the junction of the most important railway lines and is linked in communication with practically all the industrial centers of Russia. The Soviet armies have simultaneously attacked both flanks of the enemy in order to prevent the sending of reinforcements to the central column, which is in a desperate position,

because Poltava, southwest of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav to the southwest, Alexandrovsk to the south, and Taganrog to the southeast have for a considerable time been in the hands of the Reds, thus making the retreat of the central Denikin army impossible. Strategy teaches us to encircle the enemy in order to annihilate him entirely, and it looks as though the bulk of Denikin's forces were already encircled. The fall of Kharkov,* which has the same strategical significance in the south as Moscow in the north, means the end of the civil war. If we take into consideration that in the Caucasus, thanks to the White Terror of Denikin's generals, the revolutionary movement is in full progress, we see the deplorable position of the southern invaders.

All the eastern Black Sea shores, from Novorossisk to Sochi, and the towns of Ekaterinodar, Maikop, and Baku are in revolt, and most of them are already under Soviet rule. The Turkestan army, composed of three strong corps, after having defeated the British in Transcaspia and captured all the fortresses on the Persian frontier, has captured the town of Kazandzik. Its activity is very important in the present decisive moment. The friendly relations which Soviet Russia has established with Afghanistan protect the Republic of Turkestan from any attempt by the British Indian army to penetrate into that part of Soviet Russia. The news of the disaster of Kolchak and the defeat of Judenitch, as well as the beginning of peace negotiations between Soviet Russia and the Baltic states at Dorpat, must certainly become known to the army of Denikin, thus hastening the termination of the sanguinary drama in Russia. The days of Denikin are numbered. His army has no way of escape and must either capitulate to the Reds or perish.

Correspondence

Scientists as Spies

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: In his war address to Congress, President Wilson dwelt at great length on the theory that only autocracies maintain spies; that these are not needed in democracies. At the time that the President made this statement, the Government of the United States had in its employ spies of unknown number. I am not concerned here with the familiar discrepancies between the President's words and the actual facts, although we may perhaps have to accept his statement as meaning correctly that we live under an autocracy; that our democracy is a fiction. The point against which I wish to enter a vigorous protest is that a number of men who follow science as their profession, men whom I refuse to designate any longer as scientists, have prostituted science by using it as a cover for their activities as spies.

A soldier whose business is murder as a fine art, a diplomat whose calling is based on deception and secretiveness, a politician whose very life consists in compromises with his conscience, a business man whose aim is personal profit within the limits allowed by a lenient law—such may be excused if they set patriotic devotion above common everyday decency and perform services as spies. They merely accept the code of morality to which modern society still conforms. Not so the scientist. The very essence of his life is the service of truth. We all know scientists who in private life do not come up to the standard of truthfulness, but who, nevertheless, would not consciously falsify the results of their researches. It is bad enough if we have to put up with these, because they reveal a lack of strength of character that is liable to distort the results of their

work. A person, however, who uses science as a cover for political spying, who demeans himself to pose before a foreign government as an investigator and asks for assistance in his alleged researches in order to carry on, under this cloak, his political machinations, prostitutes science in an unpardonable way and forfeits the right to be classed as a scientist.

By accident, incontrovertible proof has come to my hands that at least four men who carry on anthropological work, while employed as government agents, introduced themselves to foreign governments as representatives of scientific institutions in the United States, and as sent out for the purpose of carrying on scientific researches. They have not only shaken the belief in the truthfulness of science, but they have also done the greatest possible disservice to scientific inquiry. In consequence of their acts every nation will look with distrust upon the visiting foreign investigator who wants to do honest work, suspecting sinister designs. Such action has raised a new barrier against the development of international friendly cooperation.

New York, October 16

FRANZ BOAS

"Welfare" Work in Mexico

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: Last Tuesday evening about six hundred guests enjoyed a bountiful dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria, given by the Childhood Conservation League for Mexico, Central, and South America. The purpose of the meeting was announced to be a discussion of activities of this League in the interest of Latin-American countries "in order that conditions may be bettered for the women and children of these countries." Those who came expecting to hear a discussion of the needs and rights of children were speedily disillusioned. No reference whatever was made to conditions in Central or South America, and only an occasional reference, apparently dragged in by remembering the name of the meeting, was made to children. The "facts" brought out by the various speakers were the following:

1. That Mexico has untold wealth in natural resources.
 2. That the Mexican people have had a wonderful history, which would continue were it not for the one and one-half per cent. of political agitators, including the Carranza Government and all its opponents. This small fragment of agitators was generously increased to three per cent. by one speaker, leaving ninety-seven per cent. of peace lovers who take no part either for or against the Government.
 3. That the country has been speedily going to the dogs since the days of Porfirio Diaz, who, though he may have had faults, was one of the four really great rulers of the nineteenth century, the other three being Gladstone, Bismarck, and Leo XIII.
 4. That schools and churches are closed because the Government—"richer today than ever before"—has no money to keep them open. What Mexico needs most of all is American education, as we have given it to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines.
 5. That travel is unsafe, mines are idle, and agricultural pursuits abandoned because people prefer not to produce rather than sow for a harvest which they know bandits will reap, "although there are not more than five hundred bands of bandits in all Mexico."
 6. That Mr. Jenkins is a gentleman of such sterling worth and fine Christian character that any breath of suspicion against him constitutes a national insult.
 7. That what Mexico needs is American education, American ideals, American leaders, and American business men.
- The presiding officer sounded the keynote by saying: "We are not advocating intervention in Mexico." Every speaker denied a desire to invade Mexico. One innocent listener whispered, "Me-thinks they do protest too much." The desired impression was obvious. The diners were told in substance, though not in words: "We do not intend to run to the fire, nor ask you to do it. This

*This article was already in type when the news reached New York that Kharkov had fallen and the Reds had occupied Valki, southwest of that city.

is a job for the fire department. We are Christians. We are only calling your attention to the fact that the whole structure is on fire and will collapse in the next few minutes unless the fire department (adequately armed intervention) rushes to the scene."

Just how stupid are our people supposed to be? Must we have this unsavory agitation for the subjugation of our southern neighbor smoothly oiled over by a religious and child conservation salad dressing in order to make us swallow it? Why cannot we at least be frank? Why make the innocent children of Mexico or any other country a smoke-screen to hide the designing machinations of crude and unscrupulous business enterprise? If the American people intend benevolently to assimilate Mexico, in the name of common decency let it be an open war openly arrived at.

A. Z.

New York December 8

Ruins

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: The financial and social system of Europe is in ruins. Three empires—Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary—are no more. The entire continent lies bleeding and exhausted, its four hundred millions groping for cessation from crime. More than a million square miles and scores of cities have been laid waste. As a political and Christianizing power Europe is practically dead. Nevermore will she regain her prestige until the misdeeds of the late fratricidal war have been fully atoned for, its cost paid to the last farthing, and the falsehoods it spread swept away like cobwebs.

Is Europe to be made an anarchistic plutocracy, or a socialistic republic? In either case the wound received by the whole race will empoison it and probably work its ruin—unless mercy season justice.

Reykjavik, Iceland, August 8

F. B. ARNGRINSSON

The Reddening Cup

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: I have just turned Red. For the benefit of the Lusk Investigational Sub-Committee on Revolutionary Psychology I wish to lay bare the reasons which drove me to this terrible extreme. I am not a "parlor Bolshevik." I am a "parlor-car Bolshevik" and this is the way it happened. For many years I had heard a great deal about the seat of our Government and how all 100-per cent. Americans ought to visit it. So I visited the seat and then returned to New York to recuperate. When I sat down in my chair on the Congressional Limited I was given a sheaf of printed literature about a gentleman whose name was substituted for that of William Gibbs McAdoo who said that the United States railroads were a fine thing for the country to have and would I please let him know what I did not like about them. He also told me that I could dine in three relays. This suggested the dining car as a remedy for my cold feet and damp sentiments. I walked forward a couple of blocks and reached the dining car. Six fine-looking young men in white coats were eating an equal number of turkeys. They had a large pot of butter in front of them containing more of that bovine product than the average neutral saw during a whole year of the great liberty blockade. I was glad to see everybody so happy, for I was as yet free from the Bolshevik taint. I decided not to disturb this beautiful domestic episode, but to wait. After half an hour I returned. The six fine-looking young men had finished eating and were looking in a ruminating way at the fast-fleeing Maryland landscape. I approached the conductor with gentle words and told him my need of tea. "Nothing doing," was the answer; "you can't have tea on this train." I tried to argue. "Surely," I said, "by the dampness of my shoes you can see my need of

a warm beverage." "Against the rules to serve anything before 5:30. Then you can have dinner." I told him that I did not want dinner, an hour off; I wanted tea now. "Well, you can't have it, and that is all there is to it." I tried my last argument. I borrowed it from the printed matter issued by ex-William Gibbs McAdoo. "But surely," I quoted, "since the railroads are being run for the benefit of the public and since I am the public I have a right to demand ——" "Forget your rights. You can get your dinner when it is ready and not a thing else either before or after." Then the great change came over me. It was a terrible moment. When I reached the station I bought at the newsstand "Lenin, the Man." The first chapter told me how Albert Williams had tea in a Bolshevik dining car between the cities of Mleko and Tshai at three in the morning just because one of his fellow passengers had heard him cough and had been afraid that the distinguished foreigner might develop a cold.

New York, December 7

H. v. L.

Oppressed by Propaganda

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: An essential part of the work of the League of Oppressed Peoples is to place before the American public the exact facts concerning the exploitation and oppression of subject nations. In order to do this, we have at every turn to combat a highly organized and abundantly financed official propaganda which, by concealment, falsification, and innuendo, distorts the facts and therefore misleads the popular judgment. As an evidence of the actual operation of this machinery, I am enclosing a letter that suggests one of the means by which the public is being influenced.

Since the issue concerns the whole problem of official propaganda in the country, rather than the conduct of a given paper, we have excised the name of the editor to whom this particular communication was addressed.

Evidently the plan in this particular instance miscarried, since the article in question never appeared, so far as the League has been able to discover.

ARTHUR UPHAM POPE

New York, December 12

[Facsimile of letter]

BRITISH MILITARY MISSION

BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHE
NEW YORK OFFICE44 WHITEHALL STREET
NEW YORKTELEPHONE
BOWLING GREEN 9886

October, 23rd 1919.

My dear

I understand that the Associated Press is sending out an article by Sir Valentine Chirol for release in the papers of November 27th. I hope you will have a glance at this, because I think it will put the British policy in Persia in a very clear light, and if you could see your way to make a little editorial comment about it I think it would serve a useful purpose.

Yours very sincerely,

N. G. Thwaites

Visitation

By RICHARD DEHMEL

(Translated by Leonora Speyer)

Mother Mary, canst Thou still love
With all Thy seven swords in the heart?
Hast Thou still strength, hast Thou desire,
To tear them suddenly from out
Thy tried and sore-afflicted heart?

Canst Thou again receive the Angel,
With arms outstretched and faltering foot,
That sowed within Thy joyful womb
The blessed seed of sacred lilies,
Then cast Thee at the Cross's Foot?

Canst Thou anew yield up the Son
Whom Thou hast borne with woman's pain,
And buried and in highest glory
Of seven times seventy sharpest swords,
Hast raised to Heaven, Lady of Pain?

Canst Thou once more become the Virgin,
Aglow with super-earthly blisses,
Hast Thou still faith enough and hope
All swords to melt in Thy sweet fires,
Mother Mary, Lady of Blissess?

Literature

The New Asia

The New Map of Asia. By Herbert Adams Gibbons. The Century Company.

The Awakening of Asia. By H. M. Hyndman. Boni and Liveright.

"THERE will be no peace until Asiatics have the same rights in their own country as Europeans have in theirs" is the burden of these two books. Mr. Gibbons's study is a complete and nearly exhaustive survey of the entire situation in Asia, while Mr. Hyndman's brilliant book is confined to India, China, and Japan. Mr. Hyndman starts with a general sketch of the past and present relations of Europe and Asia, pointing out on excellent authority the debt which Europe, humanity, and civilization owe to Asia. "Europe, in fact, is a great conterminus colony of Asia," says Mr. Hyndman, "which in the course of thousands of years has set up for itself. If Europe were deprived of all her peoples of ancient Asiatic origin, the greater part of Western civilization would disappear." But what is even of greater importance is the debt which Europe owes to Asia in the matter of her culture. "Withdraw the basic discoveries and inventions which we owe to Asia and the entire fabric of our existing social arrangement would collapse. Cotton, silk, porcelain, the mariner's compass, gunpowder, algebra, geometry, and astronomy, as well as much of our architecture and agriculture with many of our fruits and flowers came first into our daily lives from that continent." Besides, all the great religions of the world came from Asia. Philosophy, music, medicine, and the fine arts had their birth there. It is well that Mr. Hyndman has taken pains to remind his readers of these elementary facts of history, as the modern Westerner is so filled with his own importance and with his notions of the superiority of the West to the East that he is habitually contemptuous and patronizing towards Asia.

Mr. Hyndman has also done well in pointing out that the

political and economic dominance of Asia by Europe is only a matter of yesterday and that Asia had before that dominated the greater part of Europe for centuries. First in order came the Aryan immigration. Then came the Turanian (more popularly known as the Mongolian) conquest of southeastern Europe, which practically controlled the whole of Russia, the Balkans, and Hungary until well into the fifteenth century. These two waves were followed by the Arab and the Turkish invasions of Europe, the former covering all of southern Europe and threatening to engulf the northern countries also, until its advance northward was checked by France; the latter carrying its triumphal march to the very gate of Vienna, where it was checked by united Christendom.

The chief interest of these books, however, lies in the light they throw upon the progress and methods of "Europe's eminent domain" in Asia. Both the writers have shown such a grasp of the subject and have dealt with it in such a masterly way, with unflinching regard for truth and fairness, that we may consider them to be the best books on the subject written in the English language for a long time and accept them as genuine contributions to the subject.

Mr. Gibbons carries us step by step through the crooked labyrinths of European diplomacy as it played its game in Annam, Indo-China, Siam, Persia, the Caucasus, Turkey, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Eastern Russia, with the sole object of gaining its end by hook or crook and in utter disregard of all principles of justice and morality. For European foreign offices and chancelleries morality had only one purpose: the extension and the expansion of Imperial holdings and the political and economic enslavement of the populations concerned. "The only international law in Asia was the law of might. The Asiatics had no rights." They were there simply to be used as pawns on the international chessboard where European diplomacy played its ceaseless game.

"No commentary is needed to drive home to the reader the heartlessness, the immorality, the hypocrisy, the brutality of the European powers in their relations with Asiatic races." And this is true of all the European nations holding "eminent domain" on that continent—the British, the French, the Russians, and the Germans. All have followed the same tactics and practices. They have lent money to Asiatic rulers without the least regard to the purposes for which it was wanted, have led such rulers deliberately and with set purpose on the road to bankruptcy in utter disregard of the rights of the peoples, have demanded the mortgage of sovereign rights, and have eventually established spheres of influence, entering into treaties with other European Powers without consulting either the Asiatic rulers or the people. Mr. Gibbons has shown that each time a European Power has needed an excuse for intervention it has provoked lawlessness and has practically compelled the natives to attack the foreigners. Speaking of Persia he observes that "before British and Russians began to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia, animosity towards foreigners was unknown." The same is practically true of every Asiatic country. Mr. Hyndman has traced the history of the disgraceful provocations in China, in Japan, and in India at some length. Mr. Gibbons does not devote much space to recent happenings in India, though he notices the growth and vitality of the Nationalist movement, referring the reader to Mr. Hyndman's book under review and Mr. Lajpat Rai's book "England's Debt to India," but he shows how British policy in the rest of Asia has been determined by consideration of the paramountcy of British interests in India. In noticing Great Britain's determination to resist by all the means in her power the attempt of any other nation to establish herself in the Persian Gulf he says that "the old reason [the need of safety for British dominion in India] that held good from Gibraltar to Shanghai was given by Lord Lansdowne. Great Britain had the right to safeguard India and with this right went a virtual monopoly of trade in all the places where the right was exercised."

"What Persia has lived through since the beginning of 1912

should bring a blush of shame to the brow of every European and cause those who had given themselves up without stint to the defeat of German Imperialism in Europe to demand of their own government a complete abandonment of the Imperialism of all nations in Asia." But who is to "demand" and who is to admit when all are infected with the same disease? Since this book went to press the Anglo-Persian treaty has been concluded and the historian has nothing left but to write an epitaph on the grave of that unfortunate country. When writing his book Mr. Gibbons wondered "whether there was such a thing as an international conscience to give birth to and maintain a society of nations." We wonder what he would say now that "the society of nations" has recognized a British protectorate in Egypt and Persia and a Japanese occupation of Shantung.

We are often told in criticism of the Nationalist movements in Egypt, Turkey, Persia, India, and China that legitimate agitation for self-government and democratic institutions is marred by xenophobia. But Mr. Gibbons asks "if this is not so in the nature of every democratic movement. Europeans and Americans who criticise the form and methods of Asiatic and African political movements forget their own history."

Government Organization

Government Organization in War Time and After. By W. F. Willoughby. D. Appleton and Company.

THE sphere of government was greatly extended by this country's mobilization of its entire resources for war; and an account of the special agencies of government created by Congress has been contributed by W. F. Willoughby, Director of the Institute for Government Research, to "Problems of War and of Reconstruction," a series which promises to be a complete account of our war activities. "The present volume has for its purpose to attempt a methodical statement and description of these special war agencies and their operations. It has been necessary to restrict our attention to those agencies which represent distinct services specially created for the handling of matters connected with the prosecution of the war or the meeting of conditions engendered by the war," writes the author. His work is simple and clear in statement, although unavoidably condensed, and it is a model of accuracy and fairness. There is a further merit of Mr. Willoughby's book which Frederick P. Keppel, Third Assistant Secretary of War, points out in an introduction: "It is a valuable collection of state papers. We Americans have a way of referring to such documents with the greatest assurance, but we are not so certain to keep the provisions fresh in our memories, and in some cases perhaps we never read them at all."

The book's ambitious program could be fulfilled only by a thorough acquaintance with the vast mass of detail involved and the exercise of a practiced judgment. Mr. Willoughby has described the creation and operation of the Government's special agencies in the mobilization of industry, foreign trade, food, fuel, transportation, shipping, labor, finance, and public information, in what will probably be the standard, as it certainly is the first comprehensive, discussion of the country's organization for war, viewing it as primarily a problem in administration.

The opening chapter furnishes an example of the value for which this book was praised by Mr. Keppel. It gives the text of the Overman Act, a piece of legislation designed to concentrate administrative power in the President. "The opinion," however, as Mr. Willoughby remarks, "seems to have prevailed that under it the President could make such a reorganization of the administrative services as he saw fit, and not a little criticism has been directed against him for his failure to make a larger use of his supposed powers." But the limitations imposed by the Act itself prevented the President from accomplishing much-needed reforms in the various departments, except as regards aircraft production, for which provision was expressly made in the Act.

In his discussion of the Council of National Defense, and its subordinate Advisory Commission, several just criticisms are made by the author: it failed to formulate general plans; the Council and the Commission were not properly correlated; the organization was not manned by a permanent personnel; some of the committees resolved themselves into administrative instead of advisory bodies without authority to do so; and, most important of all, "the great mistake was made, in organizing committees and subcommittees to consider the problem of securing materials and supplies needed by the Government for the prosecution of the war, of making these committees agencies for representing the Government in its relations with the producers and manufacturers of the commodities instead of agencies for the representation of such producers."

Another calm statement of judicial character and sound judgment, as far as it goes, is to be found in the chapter on "Publicity Agencies," where the writer says of the Espionage Act, which he reproduces: "Broadly construed, it would permit the Department of Justice to proceed against, and the courts to impose severe penalties upon, any one criticizing any feature either of our constitutional system or of our form of government as established under such Constitution. It is, moreover, not apparent how such criticism could in any material way lend aid and comfort to the enemy. In administering this law it was, of course, possible for the Government and the courts to proceed in such a way that no loyal person would be injured in his rights, and in passing the law Congress acted with the belief that the law would be so administered. That the law had in it the possibility of oppression, however, can hardly be questioned." That these possibilities materialized in some cases, the author does not venture to say.

While finance is treated in some detail in this work, it is to be fully discussed as a separate topic in another volume of the same series. Not less important, and almost equalling war-finance in success, was the plan and actual functioning of the War Industries Board, which was due largely to the coöperation of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Shipping, transportation, and communication are also given adequate attention. War-time control of the railroads is a subject on which the author refuses to commit himself: "In considering this matter it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the results obtained, or to be expected, from the standpoint of the prosecution of the war and from that of giving to the country an improved system of internal transportation." With respect to the operation of the telegraph, telephone, and cable systems by the Post Office, and the popular opposition to such control, Mr. Willoughby has to say: "Regarding the justice of all these complaints, it is impossible at this time to decide. There can hardly be any question, however, that the volume of this criticism led to the issue by the President of an order during the latter part of April, 1919, that the cable systems be returned to their owners, and the Post Office Department relinquished control at midnight on May 2, 1919."

Most interesting and thorough, also, is the outline of various subjects comprised under the "Determination of Labor Conditions," in which the part played by the leaders of organized labor is described, and while some steps taken we now see were unfavorable for the period of reconstruction, the author's cautious statement wins agreement when he says: "On the whole, however, the fundamental end, that of the maintenance of industrial peace during the period of the war, was attained." The War Labor Administration provides the matter of another chapter, and it would have paid even the Labor and Capital Conference to have re-read in full the President's letter of March 28, 1918, to the Secretary of Labor, in which is set forth a fundamental program for handling labor matters.

The mobilization of food products and of fuel is also reviewed, and a summary chapter is devoted to enemy aliens and sympathizers, in which the various measures adopted for their control are described without comment. The lamentable de-

iciency in production of airplanes, probably the outstanding defect in our war activities, merits the attention which Mr. Willoughby gives it. "The failure of the Government to meet expectations in respect to the actual construction of airplanes was due to a number of causes, one of which was its failure to work out a proper system of administration for the handling of aircraft matters." The problem of administration is fundamental, and the author's analysis of the failure is instructive.

Mr. Willoughby, before any action in this direction had been taken, advocated the formation of distinct corporations for the conduct of certain government activities. As he points out: "The entrusting of an activity to a distinct corporation not only permits, but insures, its definite segregation, administratively and financially, from all other activities. This means that the enterprise will have its own property, revenues, and expenditures, its own accounting and reporting system, and its own system of administration generally." The formation of six great corporations for such service and their success during the war testifies to the author's accurate judgment. The establishment of such corporations subsidiary to the government, together with the licensing system as a means of control, and interlocking directorates as a means of securing correlation of allied activities, Mr. Willoughby considers the most important administrative devices employed during the war.

As soon as the armistice was signed, however, the War Industries Board began to remove the restrictions it had imposed, and on December 31, 1918, the Board was dissolved. Similarly, the other means of coordinating and directing national effort for war were abandoned as soon as the even more serious problems of national reconstruction presented themselves. After reading this scholarly history of the relatively higher degree of administrative efficiency attained by the country during the war, the lack of a definite national policy for labor and industry is the more keenly felt. The machinery which was so hastily dismantled at the armistice might well have been improved and altered to cope with the present situation.

Behind the Army

The Army behind the Army. By Major E. Alexander Powell. Charles Scribner's Sons.

THERE may be a great difference of opinion as to whether or in what form we should adopt universal military training to fit our youths to be soldiers, but there can be no doubt whatever that our people generally should educate themselves to be able to pass upon questions bearing upon war and peace. Congress declares war, indeed, and the President and the Senate make peace, but all of these agencies are in general as responsive to the will of the people as they know how to be. The public should know what will be the military consequences of such adopted or proposed policies as the Monroe Doctrine, the "Open Door" in China, the protective treaty with France, and membership in the League of Nations. Our journals and reviews might well give generous space to discussions concerning military matters, including the military consequences of a thousand and one procedures in which the uneducated may not see any military significance at all.

Perhaps Major Powell's book deserves a place in any well-balanced course of reading designed to educate the American public in matters military, but only if the readers be warned of a drop of propaganda it contains. Admitted that propaganda is right in war, to delude the enemy and to keep up one's own morale, as one would whistle in the dark, yet in peace, however, no one wishes to be influenced by mere propaganda. Propaganda in peace is the basis of much that is evil in business and in politics. It is not certain which of certain modern evils of war is the greater in the long run, poison gas or propaganda—probably the latter.

"The Army behind the Army" has been written by a journal-

ist who received an officer's commission when we entered the war and was assigned to work in the field of Military Intelligence. In so far as the Army was permitted to direct and employ propaganda, such work was under the Military Intelligence Department, and Major Powell's references to propaganda are most interesting and doubtless more authoritative than his references to other military matters. He states that Mr. Creel's civilian organization, to which was entrusted the greater part of all American propaganda work, was "far from being the success which the public was led to believe," implying that a part of Mr. Creel's propaganda was in behalf of Mr. Creel's organization itself. In this connection it is not hard to believe that Major Powell's book embodies within itself a very considerable amount of propaganda, designed to inspire belief that each agency of the War Department whose activities are described conducted its business without hitch or error, and with a super-efficiency which should, while exalting the bureau chief concerned, add at the same time to the complacency with which the American public habitually contemplates American achievement.

Perhaps for writing devoid of extravagance, we are still too near to the war period, when it was the duty of all, in order to promote military success, to paint war and all its trappings and activities in rosy colors. Surely there must have been some imperfections behind the lines besides those in Mr. Creel's bureau! We have no other fault to find with Major Powell's very interesting book, although certainly a large part of the activities of the Engineers, the Signal Corps, and the Air Service in no sense pertained to anything "behind" the Army. Major Powell has obviously taken much trouble to state accurately all dates, figures, and facts which are subject to check, and he has succeeded in writing an interesting and instructive account of certain auxiliary services of the army, bureaus of the War Department, and branches of the General Staff.

The Elder Novelists

Helena. By Mrs. Humphry Ward. Dodd, Mead and Company.
Sir Harry. By Archibald Marshall. Dodd, Mead and Company.
All Roads Lead to Calvary. By Jerome K. Jerome. Dodd, Mead and Company.

TO write novels as a matter of habit and of the performance of a professional duty was, perhaps, the worst failing of the Victorians of the second rank. Had Trollope given all his time to the Post Office and to fox-hunting after "The Last Chronicle of Barset" his station in literature would be appreciably higher. A similar abstention would have aided the reputation of Mrs. Humphry Ward. Silence and isolation might have been her portion for a period. But in due time it would have been recalled that in "Robert Elsmere" she did mark an historic moment in the intellectual development of England, that "The History of David Grieve" is a solid and a moving book, that her edition of Amiel was not unworthy of the traditions of the Arnolds. But she has chosen to write almost a novel a year, and as life has moved farther and farther beyond her sympathies and her insight, her successive books have become emptier and more unreal, until in "Helena" she sinks to a level incredibly below her original gifts and mental calibre. Her literary fate illustrates a truth too often neglected in discussions of the art of fiction. Knowledge and the power of observation alone do not make the novelist. Both for immediate truth and permanent significance his mind must either grasp his age or transcend it.

Mrs. Ward strains hard to make her Helena Pitstone a representative of the rebellious generation that has experienced the war. But poor Helena, alas, is only a Victorian beauty bent upon the mildest naughtiness from which in the end she quite suavely abstains. One has but to compare her to the young women in Galsworthy's "Saint's Progress" or to the bitter rebels

of Miss Delafield to know her true date and character. Her guardian, Lord Buntingford, is a Rochester without violence or harshness—a grave male beauty with a pathetic past and a wayward wife who reappears but to die obligingly. Mrs. Ward, again remembering that it is 1919, does not let Helena marry him. But the concession is obvious and will annoy the only readers to whom "Helena" can appeal as a human document at all. The book is important only as bringing home the fact, not always remembered, that both in life and art mere length of experience without inner change will not achieve that prophetic strain of which Milton spoke.

The case of Mr. Archibald Marshall is thoroughly different. Mrs. Ward is troubled; he is ineffably serene. In her day she lived with great thoughts and great men. One wonders where in the world he has lived in any deep sense at all. Mr. W. D. Howells has praised him as being "never dull, only tranquil." And tranquillity is, indeed, a beautiful quality. But there are two tranquillities: one to which a man attains, another from which he has never risen. There is the tranquillity of Milton's old age, or of Goethe's, and there is the tranquillity of Mr. Archibald Marshall. In "Sir Harry," which, according to his publishers, Mr. Marshall considers his best novel, he tells the story of the young heir of a great name and a great fortune whose father, after contracting a misalliance, had fallen in the South African War. Young Harry Brent is brought up by his grandmother in the seclusion of a noble estate, full of Tennysonian landscapes, in order to avoid his father's temptation and misfortune. But in the woods he meets a fresh young beauty who is the daughter of a shabby and not quite sober painter. Secretly he becomes betrothed to her. Next he enlists as a private in the armies of 1914. Yet his grandmother's hopes are not disappointed. Harry proves himself without fear and without reproach, and, though he falls in France, his grandmother has the supreme consolation of knowing that she had kept his instincts inviolably fine since she discovers that the lovely Viola's birth is "almost as good as Harry's own." Such is Mr. Marshall's triumphant conclusion. His pleasant gift of pictorial vividness is not so markedly present in this volume as it is in his shorter stories. There is a general sense of diffused radiance. But both sunlight and moonlight are extremely literary in character. The people, but for Mr. Marshall's sound and quiet English, would almost fall to the level of those sweet and wan or proud and distinguished persons who used to adorn the minor fiction of forty years ago. Hence, as in the case of "Helena," the reasons for speaking of this book lie beyond and without it. The suffrages of Mr. Howells and other good judges which Mr. Marshall has obtained arise from the distaste they feel for the turbulence and bitterness and frankness of the true literature of our day. They praise Mr. Marshall because he does not leave them with a sense of perturbation and unwelcome change and hence accept from him work of an intellectual order and artistic quality which, but for its negative effect upon their nerves and habits of thought, they would probably disdain.

Mr. Jerome K. Jerome is only nine years the junior of Mrs. Humphry Ward. He is many years older than Mr. Archibald Marshall. His early humorous novels and sketches have long fallen into the unconsidered life which the paper-backed novel sadly drags out among us. His later plays, such as "The Passing of the Third Floor Back," never quite commended themselves to serious or fastidious judges. But at some time in the life of his mind there came a quiet revolution which was accelerated and brought to fruition by the World War. Today, on the threshold of old age, he has written a novel so wise in substance and beautiful in temper as to put him in the ranks of that minority which has understood the struggling spirit of its time. "All Roads Lead to Calvary" lacks the incisiveness of observation which the younger British novelists offer. Joan Allway is a little too much a heroine both in her beauty and in her somewhat schematic character. But the book is very thickly peopled and many of the faces that we see are vivid and eloquent. None are a blur of false beauty or pinchbeck nobility.

All contribute definitely to a certain massive picture of the tone and the direction of English life which it was the purpose of Mr. Jerome to draw for us. The starting point of the story lies fifteen years in the past when Joan Allway, fresh from Girton, went up to London to engage in journalism. Through the experiences of herself and her friends we are permitted, quite unobtrusively and artistically, to catch the drift not only of personal but of national lives and to be present at the throttling of all truly reasonable and peaceful and democratic impulses by a press to which war became, like fire or rapine, a legitimate sensation, and wild chauvinism a source of increased circulation and sinister power. We are invited to behold the Anglo-French crisis of some years ago which bore on both sides the same marks of nationalistic ferocity and ignoble clamor as a later and more disastrous one. "The moment there is any threat of war, it becomes a point of honor with every nation to do nothing to avoid it." At last we inevitably reach the year 1914, and in Mr. Jerome's presentation of his chief characters' attitude to that moment of history, in his fine passages on war and heroism, in his most memorable conversation among common men in the trenches in France, he establishes a new place for himself as a writer and a man. But he does not let his impassioned though temperate tendency confuse the human interest or the human values of his story. Both indeed gather force and concreteness as the book progresses, and illustrate how art is deepened and enriched by just thought and unclouded feeling. Mr. Jerome has lived very deeply and understandingly through these later years of his and, unlike so many, has come out of the long tunnel of the war a more sensitive artist, a more careful thinker, and a friend of mankind.

Books in Brief

IN 1915 Henry Osborn Taylor published under the title "Deliverance" the book which now reappears, from the same plates, entitled "Prophets, Poets and Philosophers of the Ancient World" (Macmillan). Neither title is just to the book. "Deliverance" was at once historically too vague and in connotation too episodic to indicate the scope of the author's intent, and the new title, while certainly better, fails entirely to suggest the centrality of theme and interest which enables Mr. Taylor to bring together studies of ancient Oriental, classical, and Christian thought and make not a collection but a book. The author has added a preface to this new edition in which he says "Some men live in the eternities and must at their peril keep in tune with them"; and this, perhaps as well as any phrase, indicates the central theme. It leads, however, to no discursive end; for with a sagacity at once artistic and true Mr. Taylor plays the light of his mind upon traits which are essential and universal, and derive directly from man's most humane intelligence. It would be difficult, in the range of current philosophical writing, to find the match in penetration—both into human nature and into all nature—of the final chapter in which the diverse strands of ancient thinking are restored to their fundamental fabric; nor is there much in contemporary thinking that is so deeply wise as the paragraph in which the author sets forth the whole problem of spiritual endeavor, ancient and modern: "For ourselves we have found no single answer to life's problem other than life itself, its need-inspired, forward-driving struggle, wherein endeavor is attainment and the path is the goal. And yet with these ancient seers, as with our weakly faltering selves, the tensest fibre of the endeavor which is attainment, is the accompanying vision of a more absolute attainment beyond the sheer endeavor—the hope for some of them and some of us of a divine and eternal verity of attainment, standing as the cliff upon which the waves of our endeavor beat."

AFTER three years, the three most eventful years in modern times, we have a new collection of essays by Maurice Mae-

terlinck, "Mountain Paths" (Dodd, Mead). Considered from any standpoint the volume yields at first only a sense of thwarted anticipation. Is it the paralyzing spell of the World War, so destructive of philosophic calm, or is it rather the limitations of the individual genius, be he poet or philosopher, which casts its blight over the early chapters? Why do the best of these seem merely commentaries or applications of ideas grown trite even in Maeterlinck's own mystic writings? Why, asks the reader, should the philosopher have included the purely narrative chapter of Belgian history, Three Unknown Heroes; why the forty-page essay on Gambling and the "systems" of Monte Carlo—a discussion maddening in its intellectual dilution and unrelieved by any significant conclusion? Hardly more satisfactory is the long review of Henri Fabre's "Souvenirs Entomologiques," which skims the cream of the marvels observed in a lifetime, learning from the patient scientist's refusal to synthesize rashly only a blind adoration of a world incomprehensible. One may respect the mystic's *O Altitude*, but one finds it harder to condone intellectual thinness and inconsequence. Even a Maeterlinck should not reprint his literary journalism in a volume intended to take its place beside "Le Trésor des Humbles." The last half of the essays, however, is of closer texture: the web has a finer and more intricate pattern, although the web seems in place dangerously thin. Admirers of the Belgian mystic will find all the old thrill in these attempts to interpret the gospel of Hindu philosophy by the light of modern science; philosophic minds will rejoice that the Oriental point of view—the surest remedy that the world could find for the malady which has all but ruined the Occident—has found another interpreter; and every reader will feel the majesty of the philosophic vistas disclosed in the master's limpid prose. They may remember that many of these vistas, in all their spectral beauty, were revealed in the last work of Lafcadio Hearn. But none will fail to appreciate the æsthetic quality of these suggestive essays, so well rendered in the clear and competent English translation of Mr. Teixeira de Mattos that the book scarcely seems to be a translation.

IN his "Mastery of Nervousness," Dr. Robert S. Carroll presented a sound and attractive guide for sanity of nerves, reinforcing medical doctrine by moral precept. "The Soul in Suffering" (Macmillan) reverses the perspective and becomes the work of a moralist, slightly tempered by medical concern. The result is disappointing. It lacks the vigor and originality of the physician in counsel, and hardly attains to more than the ordinary level of the exhorter with a sensitive discrimination for argument and consolation. The book rambles vaguely in easy generalizations—all in good temper but without justification in the expertness of the writer. It is well enough to say that "real sickness comes when we surrender. Real sickness enters life only when we give up to the powers of gloom. . . . When circumstances become our master, then we are ill"; but does such counsel summarize the message and service of the physician, or does it detract from the distinctive balm which comes from the professional status of the dispenser of the healing art? No one questions the right of the practitioner to address the public in moral vein; nor does one's questioning advise the shoemaker to stick to his last. It is a pity that the wise physician be exchanged for an indifferent moralist, or that the anatomist turn shoemaker. There may be many who will find in Dr. Carroll's appeal some guidance in perplexity, some strengthening of waning confidence. To them the book will be justified; to the more critical minded, it carries the flavor of an intention failing by reason of too conscious insistence upon itself.

A BRIEF for the plaintiff against the Japanese Government is entitled "The Oriental Policy of the United States," by Henry Chung, Korean envoy to the Peace Conference at Paris (Revell). Some exception may be taken to a title which does not confess its controversial character, but the book is remark-

able in more than one respect. It is extremely well expressed in an English that is evidently the author's own, and the issue is debated with a reserve that compares favorably with the literature of some suppressed nationalities made familiar by the recent war. The Koreans themselves have so little reason to hope for independence in the near future that Mr. Chung is wisely content to dismiss the subjection of his people for the present as a *fait accompli*. In this arraignment of Japan he endeavors to make clear to the Western world her far-reaching ambition, her energetic character, and her underhand methods. The onus of every charge is against not a people but a government which works like a perfectly adjusted machine, subtle, irresistible, implacable. The nature of the author's indictment is not novel, but its suppressed intensity reveals the consuming fear inspired among the victims of this Frankenstein monster created by a heedless group of Western nations. The agony of the appeal to take heed before it is too late is very real. As Japan has done to Korea, Mr. Chung argues, so she will do to China, Russia, and the rest of mankind until her Kultur is dominant. Thus far her forward leaps to new power have been made at ten-year intervals: she crushed China in 1894, Russia in 1904, Germany in 1914. "The dates of 1924 and 1934," he adds, "are open, and Japan has a few more issues to settle with foreign nations—especially with the United States." To frustrate the consolidation of Asia under Japanese domination Mr. Chung advises two measures, the release of China by a European agreement from the economic disabilities imposed under her treaties and the development of her natural resources by the combined capital of all the Powers. The plan is a sensible one and has been advocated for the settlement of Turkey, but if Japan is "the armed bully of the East," as here portrayed, can we expect her sanction of any such coöperation on the part of her rivals who, according to his argument, remain her secular enemies so long as they exist?

THERE was a time in the days before the Revolution when the American world was considerably larger than it became after separation from England had restricted its area to the narrow strip of continental coast from Maine to Georgia. The colonists knew their West Indies, Wine Islands, and Africa better than do their descendants, and their family and race groups, though scattered widely, still retained their unity and clannish feeling, even when far apart and rarely in communication with one another. It has been the custom of writers on American history to ignore this fact, treating the thirteen colonies as if in isolation and viewing as something exceptional such an event, for example, as the birth of Alexander Hamilton in the island of Nevis. In fact, however, there was nothing exceptional in Hamilton's birth, as many good Americans were born in the British West Indies or had interests there, and were accustomed to go back and forth with considerable frequency. This old-time circumscribed view of colonial history will not be changed among writers at large until more books have been written showing the close relations that existed among the different parts of the colonial world. Happily such books are being written, and among them is one on the Royal African Company by Professor George F. Zook, of the State College of Pennsylvania, who has spent much time in England studying the records of the company, and who will add a very important chapter to colonial history when he has completed what he has planned. In the meantime, he has printed in *The Journal of Negro History* (April, 1919) a first instalment covering the period to 1672, when the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa was reorganized as the Royal African Company. If one wishes to have a better understanding of Anglo-Dutch relations leading to the capture of New Amsterdam and the ousting of the Dutch from the North American continent let him read the third chapter of this work. He will find that the problem is not so simple as American writers have been accustomed to make it and that the causes of this important event in our history must be sought as much in Africa as in America.

THERE is nothing essentially Hellenic about those conceptions of peace which Dr. Wallace E. Caldwell presents in his "Hellenic Conceptions of Peace" (Longmans, Green). For these conceptions are far too universal to be claimed by any race or nation. What Mr. Caldwell has done (and done well) is to restate what the Greek poets, historians, orators, and political leaders have said and written about the desirability of peace. For that was their theme, that peace was desirable and war was destructive. He has also traced for us, in the tumultuous course of Greek history, the attempts to preserve the peace and the causes of their failure. There is much in Dr. Caldwell's record that has special pertinency to these times, as, for instance, this quotation from Isocrates, the pacifist and rhetorician: "It is to no purpose that we make treaties of peace; for we do not settle our wars, but only defer them and wait for the time when we shall be able to inflict some irremediable injury on one another." And Dr. Caldwell's summary of the reasons for the Greek city-states' failure (through the Amphictyonic Councils) to preserve the peace is also significant today. "Athens was never willing to give up her claims to power; Sparta felt that she could not part with her military system; Thebes would not surrender her hopes for the hegemony of Greece. Whenever a settlement was near, some element of jealousy or of hatred, some fear of undue influence or interference, some unwillingness to yield the least jot, lest pride and prestige be injured, came up to wreck all hopes of lasting peace."

THE *opere minores* of Ellwood Hendrick, whose larger task has been the popularizing of chemistry, are reprinted in "Percolator Papers" (Harpers) from sources as diverse as *The Atlantic Monthly* and the official organ of the Chemist's Club, *The Percolator*, from which the collection takes its name. The essays range from slight social sketches to elaborate and serious discourses on science, industry, education, and religion. Mr. Hendrick's opinions have ripened long in the wood. But in decanting them he shows less the amenities of the essayist than the inflexible technique of the trained laboratory worker. The main props of his wit and wisdom consist in the transposition of scientific facts into current literary language and in the invention of analogies between human conduct and such physical or chemical phenomena as osmosis or catalysis. These devices, legitimate enough in the literary tool-bag, he delights to exhibit for the sheer joy of seeing them work. His essays resemble the game in which children first pound an imaginary nail, then saw imaginary wood. Mr. Hendrick plays the game with admirable zest, which in the long run, however, fails to cover up his lack of palpable substance. Stripped of their insulating terminology, scientific conclusions do not inevitably burst into the incandescence he imagines; too often the result is merely a short-circuit.

Art

A Right Way to Use Museums

THE Exhibition of Textiles and Costumes at the American Museum of Natural History might, with profit, have been kept open for months instead of weeks. Had it been less interesting, its educational value would still have been great as an example of how a museum should and can be used. A museum is not intended merely to serve as a national or municipal storehouse, and we are beginning to realize the waste when it is not put to practical purposes. Collections are not made, voyages of discovery taken, exploring expeditions organized, merely that the public may gape at the results set out in cases and hung up on walls. Nor are even the occasional visits of school children in classes a sufficient return. A year ago the Metropolitan undertook to show the influence such collections could have, if intelligently studied, on the industrial arts of the

country. And this lesson the Museum of Natural History has repeated, though more especially in connection with textiles. If great painters have owed part of their training to copying the paintings of the earlier masters, so have great designers owed much of theirs to adopting the designs of the past, and it is in this way that tradition has been carried on.

The exhibition gives a chance for comparison by placing modern textiles and costumes against an ethnological background, and it also illustrates the methods by which the textiles have been and are produced. It might be thought far-fetched to show primitive fashions alongside the latest display from Fifth Avenue shop windows. But it is more extraordinary to discover how alike they are. Just as painters and sculptors are skipping back over centuries to seek inspiration, so, apparently are designers. Save for the wide difference in quality, the gown of the Sioux woman is not very different from the gown, thought ultra-modern, of the fashionable women of today, who has also taken a hint for her costliest wraps from the Eskimo's cloak. But the designer of dress has some reason, which the painter of pictures has not, for the return to primitive motives. The clothing of Sioux and Eskimos is beautiful in its way because necessity shaped it. Civilized woman, when she set the fashions and was not guided by necessity, made of her dress a hindrance and a burden, until, as we know her in old portraits and remember her in the crinolines of the sixties or in her trailing skirts of not so many years ago, she was far more barbarous than the barbarians of the plains or of the ice-fields. Her dress today, when pushed to an extreme, is as ugly and uncomfortable. But when not exaggerated, it is more sensible and comfortable than it has been for centuries past, for women—that is, the women who trouble about fashion—lead more active lives than they did and cannot afford to be cramped and hindered by their dress. And the unexpected outcome of it is that models for the "latest things" in jackets and blouses, cloaks and skirts, come from the Philippines or the Wild West, from the land of the hairy Ainu or from remote Siberia. Ethnological specimens and Fifth Avenue creations placed side by side, explain how a design can be studied and adapted and carried further, until the copy, or adaptation, becomes an original.

Primitive ornament has been as copiously borrowed from by the masters of fashions. The Museum has fine examples, above all, of Indian ornament in the beadwork and baskets of the Sioux and of the Apaches, the blankets of the Navajos, the pottery of many tribes, even of the pre-historic Pueblos, the beautiful mesh-bags of the Valiente Indians of Panama. Primitive color, usually too vivid and crude for our more sophisticated eyes, has in these Panama mesh-bags at times a refinement and delicacy which the designer of today might find it hard to emulate. It is suggestive to see how many Indian motives and color effects have been applied to modern dress, and how free from vulgarity or crudeness are the results. The beauty of the ornament is in its appropriateness. There are examples, too, of the intelligent use of batik, or the Javanese process of decorating textiles. And the beadwork alone, modern and primitive, should be an inexhaustible source of inspiration to the student.

In the textiles, modern manufacturers have, of course, reached a finer quality than was possible to savage or barbarian looms, and, in this respect, the best American silks and cottons can hold their own, as the exhibition proves. The color is often very lovely and full of subtlety, though the wearers of silks and decorators of rooms complain of its lack of wearing qualities. It is a question whether our dyes can yet compete with the German dyes of which we are so unwilling to avail ourselves. In design there is an improvement, though not based, apparently, upon sound knowledge or principles. When old models and motives are adhered to—and those models and motives are oftener French or Italian or Persian than savage and barbarian—the designer has not gone far wrong. But

when he has struggled to be original, he reveals the poverty of his own resources. There are cretonnes that for tawdriness and flamboyance could not have been outdone in the seventies and eighties, silks and ribbons that it would be a penance to wear. That some of the silks and cretonnes should be as good as they are, however, is encouraging, and is no doubt due to the fact that there are industrial art schools in the country in which the technical study of textiles is provided for, though the other industrial arts must thrive as they may on theory. But much is yet to be done, and it cannot be done without properly equipped schools in which designers and skilled artisans can be trained.

A further interest is added to the exhibition by the collection of looms, from the primitive to the highly elaborate Jacquard. And a further stimulus is in the fact that, at least in a few cases, the names of designers as well as exhibiting firms are given. The designer, upon whom beauty depends, is usually the last to be honored, or even remembered. N. N.

Drama

The Cult of Prettiness

IN the art of the theatre, if in no other, we cultivate prettiness and are afraid of beauty. How entrancingly pretty our leading actresses are! Miss Billie Burke has an exquisite child-likeness, Miss Laurette Taylor a liquid pathos of expression, Miss Elsie Janis a boyish freshness and grace. Beauty is a thing almost from another world. It would not so swiftly reveal itself to so many eyes. It arises from deeper sources. It brings not only peace but also a sword. Neither in life nor in art will prettiness burn the topless towers of Ilion. Genius and beauty hold a menace and a flame. Talent and prettiness delight and soothe. One might almost achieve them oneself! Such is, un-

consciously enough, the reaction of our wider audiences. The managers and stage directors are equally at ease. Their ways are ways of pleasantness. Miss Burke is not fretting to play Electra, Miss Taylor is content not to appear as Lady Macbeth. Miss Janis dances like an elf, but she does not insist on dancing the tarantella of Nora Helmer.

So, by a happy and tacit conspiracy, pretty plays are found for these pretty stars—plays in which they can wear charming clothes and have their lovely innocence of aspect safely aspersed by dark doubts. No moral discomfort will arise from such plotting. You know from the first that Miss Burke and Miss Taylor are as harmless as they are pretty. They are irremediably sweet. Beauty may dwell with guilt and bitterness and wisdom, knowing the earthly and the heavenly love. When Miss Burke and Miss Taylor let down their hair, you think of the nursery; beauty with the same gesture evokes a vision of the ancient night lit by its burning stars. A whole dramaturgy of the pretty could be derived from such reflections, and it is more than a jest to point out that on the screen actresses who approach beauty of person or expression are cast for the parts of "vampires."

It is discouraging to find Mr. W. Somerset Maugham among the builders of pretty and harmless plays. For at the core of every such play there must be at least an apparent acceptance of all the values of the market-place, a repetition of all the conventional moral gestures. Thus in "Caesar's Wife" (The Liberty Theatre) we are introduced at Cairo to a British proconsul benevolently saving an inferior people "not ripe for democracy" from itself, gallantly conscientious in this service of the Empire and of mankind, summoning his wife, who is twenty years his junior, to curb her wandering fancy and walk the path of duty because that Empire needs her. Miss Burke, having rendered many moments of emotional stress with excellence though always in miniature, does her bit. To be sure, the play is well written, and the proconsul, granting him his official

THE THREE MULLA MULGARS

By Walter de la Mare

"A work unexcelled in its class—if indeed it is not a class all alone . . . it ranks with the few children's classics in the English language."—Llewellyn Jones in the *Chicago Evening Post*. Profusely illustrated in color and black and white by Dorothy P. Lathrop. \$3.50 net.

THE PLOT AGAINST MEXICO

By L. J. de Bekker

An exposé of an imminent capitalist junker plot to involve us in a war with Mexico in the interests of American oil investments. The importance of this book at this moment need hardly be urged—it tells the truth about various ugly facts which have been guarded and which the liberals of America should know at once. Illustrated. \$2.00 net.

THE LIFE OF FRANCIS PLACE [1771-1854]

By Graham Wallas

"It is an illuminating, interesting, and timely book, and one far better worth reading in these mysterious and clouded days than any of the Lives of the Prime Ministers, Lord Chancellors, and Archbishops who 'flourished' during the same period."—*The London Nation*. \$3.50 net.

P. S.—About JOSEPH HERGESHEIMER'S books: *LINDA CONDON*. Just published. "Reveals another phase of his surprising power as a novelist."—*N. Y. World*. *MOUNTAIN BLOOD*, a novel of the Virginia mountains today, and *THE LAY ANTHONY*, a romance, have been reissued in revised editions. *THE HAPPY END* contains seven fine short stories. Then there are *JAVA HEAD*, a novel of old Salem, and *THE THREE BLACK PENNYS*, of the early iron furnaces of Pennsylvania; and *GOLD AND IRON*, three short novels.

ALFRED A. KNOPF, 220 West Forty-Second St., NEW YORK



OUR WAR WITH GERMANY. A History.

By John Spencer Bassett

A complete story—up to the Senate's consideration of the treaty—of our part in the war, by the Professor of American History at Smith College. Includes chapters on financial credits, organizing the national resources, aircraft production, naval operations, etc. Eight maps. \$4.00.

TWENTY DRAWINGS

By Kahlil Gibran

A representative collection of the best work of the great painter-poet of the Near East, of whom Rodin said "He is the William Blake of the twentieth century." "An imagination," said *The Dial*, "which goes to the mountains and the elements for strength." \$3.50 net.

THE INWARD LIGHT

By Allan Davis and Anna R. Stratton. Introduction by Walter Prichard Eaton

"It's an historical drama about Quakers in the Civil War. (Incidentally, the only real Civil War drama besides Herne's 'Griffith Davenport'.) The play struck me as on a very high, and unusual plane of spiritual fervor and beauty."—Walter Prichard Eaton. \$1.35 net.

premises, is an admirably wise person. Mr. Maugham, as if to make up for the man's political romanticism, has made him a realist of the emotions. When his young wife falls in love with his secretary, he becomes neither violent nor pathetic. He knows that the world goes on and that passions fade and that, in one way or another, each man gets what truly belongs to him at last. And Mr. Norman Trevor, an actor of constantly ripening ability, plays the part with such intelligence and sobriety that one is deceived at moments in regard to the fatal discrepancy within the play between the sophomoric and pretty, and the well-considered and credible.

Mr. J. Hartley Manners might almost have written "One Night in Rome" (The Criterion Theatre) to illustrate, by an extraordinary indirection, our helpless dedication to the pretty and innocuous. Through two acts and a half of this play Miss Laurette Taylor is given the part of an Italian fortune-teller who has established herself in London. Here the dialogue is sane, flexible, and often incisive, and Miss Taylor may be said almost literally to transcend herself. She is austere, at moments almost harsh. But her austerity is shot with gleams of some tragic passion held in leash. She is quiet of speech throughout and gives the lover of fine acting minutes of acute pleasure with the unobtrusive eloquence of her morbidly sensitive and expressive hands. One did not, knowing Mr. Manners's past, expect a great play. But one was quite ready, if only everything went well to the end, to assign a new rank both to him and to Miss Taylor. Everything, unhappily, went as badly as possible in the atrocious last half of the third act. The fortune-teller was not an Italian at all. No inner experience had given her that rich and subtle loveliness of aspect and demeanor. It was all put on. She had once married a bad, bad foreigner who has long been dead. She is really a dear little English girl. She takes off her dark wig and puts her golden curls against the broad bosom of a British major and everything, including Miss Taylor herself now, is as pretty as you please.

A History of The Nation

Fifty Years of American Idealism

By GUSTAV POLLAK

gives the history of this great weekly from its establishment in 1865, through the year 1915. Those who have but recently become readers of *The Nation* will have an opportunity, through the pages of this volume, to learn something of its background and the work of those who contributed to the success of its first half century.

\$3.50 a copy

Order through the
Readers' Service Department
The Nation

20 Vesey Street,

New York, N. Y.

No one escapes the great cult, not even the Theatre Guild. "The Rise of Silas Lapham" is not, assuredly, an unbearably austere book. But in the dramatization of it presented at the Garrick Theatre the fable and the characters have been softened and sweetened and blurred until they almost melt into the stock figures of sentimental comedy. Mr. James K. Hackett, in the title rôle, becomes a garrulous hayseed whose sentimental vapors are punctuated by moments of false moral struggle that recall the days when Mr. Hackett, clad in a superb uniform, stood in the castle of Zenda and by the rippling muscles in his faultless chin showed duty and inclination coming nobly to the grapple. The costumes and interiors of the period are beautifully designed by Mr. Lee Simonson; the stage management, especially in the ball-room scene, is creditable to Mr. Moeller's adroitness and skill. But the whole dramatization and performance are wrong in tone, atmosphere, and emphasis through a constant yielding to the sentimental, the trivial, and the pretty. There were numerous allusions, artistic and political, to mark the date of the action. But the play's inner content bore no sign of any country except stageland and its traditions of sentimental characterization. A redeeming moment or two owe their existence wholly to the occasional passages of unaffected realism in the acting of Miss Grace Henderson and to the flashes of emotional sincerity which Marjorie Vonnegut never fails to wring from the essential coolness of her art and temper. No one grudges the Theatre Guild the modest profits which this play, less foolish after all than many others, is likely to bring in. But it is high time for the Guild to illustrate once more its adherence to those more serious ideals which the directors unquestionably entertain.

If prettiness and its innocence keep our dramas from being serious, they may also be said to keep our farces from being amusing. Throughout its history—and it is a very long one—farce has aroused laughter by presenting people in absurd and uncomfortable predicaments. Into these predicaments the characters of farce fall by committing the follies and excesses to which human nature is addicted. But since on our stage human nature must be shown as not really addicted to these at all, and since pretty is as pretty does, our farces are anæmic and clownish. Our actresses are pretty and must be innocent; the men may be silly, but their conduct must be fundamentally correct. Thus the eternal contents of the lower human comedy which a Molière did not disdain are reduced to a game of hide and seek adorned by slightly provocative costumes. The authors of "My Lady Friends" (The Comedy Theatre), for instance, attempt not unintelligently to substitute bits of social satire for the broader contents of farce. But their efforts even thus are crippled by the necessary innocuousness of the fair women and good men whom they must show. Our moral illusionism lies at the root of the whole situation. We like to think of ourselves as a nation of kindly, proper, good-looking, romantically virile people. Between the mirror of the stage and ourselves we hold up for reflection that comfortable and sentimental dream.

L. L.

Whatever book you want

Hranawater's

has it, or will get it.

We buy old, rare books, and sets of books
NEW YORK and PHILADELPHIA

International Relations Section

Contents

WHEREIN THE ALLIES FAILED. By Prince Max of Baden.....	807
DOCUMENTS: The Terms of the Protocol—British Treatment of Russian Prisoners	810
FOREIGN PRESS: The Question of War Responsibility.....	812

Wherein the Allies Failed

By PRINCE MAX OF BADEN*

I CANNOT allow to go unchallenged the widespread conception among the Socialists of the Entente that the peace efforts of the Socialists and Democrats of Germany during the war were not sincere.

They speak of the Reichstag peace resolution. I regretted the moment at which it came; in the background were shattered illusions with regard to U-boats which were the real cause, the *vice d'origine*. Among its strongest advocates there were, of course, opportunists, who, like Wilson, had a sliding scale of peace aims. But I should consider it a superficial judgment if on that account one were to consider the peace resolutions of the Reichstag an insincere manoeuvre. We must not forget that each of the three parties, which on the 19th of July decided on united action, was founded on a world philosophy which demanded respect for the rights of other peoples. Among the members of the Reichstag who were in favor of the resolution and who defended it outside, were men who, without regard to the military situation, had worked for a peace of understanding. I cite here, only as an example, Governor von Rechenberg of the Centre party, whose wise and humane administration of East Africa contributed greatly to the loyalty of the natives during the war; I mention also Conrad Haussmann and Gothein and the former member of the Reichstag, Ebert.

It cannot be denied that after July, 1917, scepticism and opportunism were again to be found in the ranks of a majority of the Reichstag, and many vacillating figures made themselves unpleasantly prominent. This was due not only to the improvement in the military situation, but primarily to the repudiation of the peace resolution by the enemy countries. If, in answer to the decision of July 19, a similar declaration had been made by the British House of Commons or by the American Congress, the advocates of a peace founded on justice would have become the undisputed masters of the situation, not only in their own parties, but throughout Germany, no matter how favorable our military situation might have appeared. But instead of this response there came new "knockout manifestos" from Clemenceau and from Lloyd George. The chauvinists of the Entente understood in a masterly way how to excite the primitive instincts of the German people and to cripple the German "moderates." These have been the French chauvinist tactics from time immemorial. I recall how they jeered at the Kaiser on account of his annoying love for peace, and called him "*Guillaume le Timide*." Similarly, during the war Lloyd George alternately spoke of us as

"Huns" and as "white rabbits"—"Huns" whom one had to fight to the death, and "white rabbits" who were too cowardly to crawl out of their holes. There was method behind these provocative terms, the method of the *agent provocateur*.

It is untrue if it is stated that I had tried before 1918 to persuade the leaders of the Government and of the army to accept a peace by negotiation, and that my efforts were frustrated by a desire to continue the war on the part of the militarists. The problem was entirely different. On the basis of the interviews I had at that time with Herr von Kühlmann, the Imperial Chancellor, Count Hertling, and later at General Headquarters, I am ready to testify at any time: if at that time the British or French Governments or President Wilson, or all of them together, had declared, "Make a public statement concerning the restoration of Belgium, declare yourselves ready to discuss the question of Alsace-Lorraine with us at the conference table, and then we will negotiate with you," the Government would have been ready to treat on that basis. No Government in the face of such a conciliatory policy on the part of our enemies would have had the power to demand of the German people an offensive involving such an enormous sacrifice of blood, no matter how certain might appear the victory of our arms.

But no such declaration was made by our enemies. On the contrary, in the beginning of February came the decision of the War Council at Versailles rejecting the idea of negotiation and declaring that the decision must be made by force of arms.

An influential Berlin militarist, a political associate, who until February had been in favor of a declaration concerning Belgium, said to me after the Versailles decision, "From now on, no German can mention the word 'peace.'" This was the psychological situation which I found in Berlin. This is not the occasion to discuss in detail my interview with General Ludendorff. But I can say this much: I did not go to him as a pacifist whose program was "peace at any price before the offensive," but I proposed to him a policy which in my opinion was calculated to open a way either to peace or to victory. This is still my conviction: if before the offensive, we had spoken the conciliatory word with regard to Belgium and at the same time had placed our Eastern policy on an unassailable basis of justice, then either the war party in England would have fallen, or if chauvinism had still held out, the responsibility for the military consequences would have been on the heads of the enemy Governments, and their people would not have withstood the crises of the spring and early summer of 1918. Our morale, however, would have remained better, for in that case, politically speaking, our military offensive would have been the offensive of our enemies.

At that time I wrote in a memorandum: "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you." I still maintain today that if we had had justice on our side in the East and in the West, and the enemy had refused to make peace, then throughout the world, even behind the lines of our enemies, moral strength would have been mobilized for our cause, and the work of our soldiers would have been immeasurably lightened.

The position of a moral leader among the European states was vacant. There is no question that up to that time the

*Prince Max of Baden was Chancellor under the German Imperial Government from October 3 until November 8, 1918, when he resigned. The article here printed is the only comprehensive public statement which Prince Max has made since his retirement, of the principles which governed his administration.—EDITOR.

great tradition of British liberalism would have entitled Great Britain to the rôle. Before the war, there were not only individual liberal groups but great sections of the population of Great Britain, even conservative religious groups, which were actuated by a feeling of responsibility towards mankind. Great Britain might have become the centre of the European conscience. It had proclaimed Russia's shame more loudly throughout the world than any other country, to the terror of Russian oppressors and the hope of the oppressed. Great Britain had held the right of political asylum inviolate, in spite of great inconveniences, in contrast to Germany and France. Great Britain had most conscientiously guarded the reputation of the white race. To be sure, the official British policy was often one of robbery, but at least the world conscience was preserved in the Opposition.

That was a great tradition; it was miserably destroyed during the war. British liberalism became the accomplice and the tool of Russia. It maintained a silence which greatly impaired the respect of the native-born African for the white race; it permitted the Government to deny the right of political asylum; it sanctioned war against German non-combatants. Here was an unheard-of opportunity for German policy. Between us and justice stood only the Belgian question. Our well-defined national interests were identical everywhere with the interests of humanity; we had only boldly to abandon our basis of national egotism and consider the happiness and rights of other nations in connection with our national will.

The great moment came before the U-boat war in 1917 and again before the offensive of 1918. The menace to the Allies of the military situation could have been better exploited politically than by a successful military attack. Our military situation was extraordinarily good, the blockade was over, the prestige of our generals unimpaired. There was confusion in the ranks of our opponents. The American war organization was not yet in working order. Great Britain changed its chief of staff at the eleventh hour; Foch was still an unknown quantity, his name not yet a source of strength. At such a moment Germany's unequivocal stand for a peace of justice would have had an irresistible power, whether for peace or for victory. This was the substance of my memorandum which was written before the offensive. This was the substance of my representations at Berlin and at General Headquarters.

Concerning the feeling at General Headquarters, I can only repeat that if the Allies had been willing to negotiate, Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and General Ludendorff would have been willing to give up the offensive. The decision was extremely difficult for both of them. They did not go into it lightly, like so many of the strategists at home, particularly those in journalistic circles. I could still see the traces of their tremendous moral struggle when I arrived at Kreuznach. The aim I had set for myself I did not attain. It was as follows: General Ludendorff should say to the Government, "I will not strike until you have established a definite program of war aims which shall contain a clear statement with regard to Belgium." The General Staff could not bring itself to take this step, but I am firmly convinced that if the Government had approached Ludendorff and of its own accord suggested this plan, the General Staff would have yielded; unwillingly, to be sure, and with a heavy heart; still, it would have yielded.

When I was called in in October, the basis for my policy had been destroyed. That basis was as follows: "Let us

seek peace while we are powerful. Let us go to the peace table while we are in a position to say, 'No,' and then to make another offensive if necessary." The General Staff rendered the actual situation still more acute by its order for an armistice, which made the disappointment of the German people a psychological catastrophe and destroyed the peace parties in the enemy countries. The command for an armistice was not justified by the situation from September 29 to October 3. After the armistice Wilson was sole ruler in the popular sentiment. Confidence in him was unbounded.

In the first weeks of October, a revolution took place in Germany. If by a "revolution" you understand officers thrown into the water, murdered hostages, epaulettes torn from the shoulders, civil war, a disgraceful whining in the face of the enemy, and a besmirching of the national honor, the revolution of October was not a revolution. But if by the word "revolution" you understand a mental upheaval, a change of heart, then the October Government was the beginning of a real revolution. The German people seized with enthusiasm upon the idea of justice. It grasped at the idea in despair, as a last anchor of safety, as a mighty protection, which Wilson had promised with the strength of a prophet, and, to quote his words, "as the friend of the German people."

People will quote to me the ugly speech from Hamlet: "The devil is sick, the devil a monk would be," to which I reply that the belief in the power of justice in the life of a nation is none the less real for being born in misery. It came as a solace to the German people. This conversion to the idea of a League of Nations on the part of a nation of seventy million people living in the middle of Europe and accustomed to wars, signified not only a German, but a European revolution.

A Pan-German general wrote to me from the battlefield at that time saying he had done Wilson an injustice and that he now had faith in the victorious power of right. This revolution might have been effected if Wilson and the British liberals had played the game. But the British "moderates" kept silent under the intoxication of victory. I call attention especially to Lord Lansdowne. President Wilson was not content with our real democratization, of which he was surely convinced, but he wished to show sensational democratic achievements in Germany, which would strengthen his position with the Republicans. The October Government was left in the lurch by its sympathizers in the enemy countries, the advocates of a peace of justice. For this reason the constructive revolution of October was followed by the revolution of November, which destroyed everything and built up nothing. President Wilson had allied himself with Trotzky's money and the German Independents to bring about this revolution. It was not only a national, but an international catastrophe. However, those who by their war policy maimed and crippled the German people and broke down their morale by ordering the armistice, have no right to sit in judgment upon them. The November revolution left us absolutely defenseless against an enemy who, in the intoxication of victory, thought only of plunder and glory. The Independents who wished to commit sabotage on the war when the military situation was at its best, because they feared an overwhelming German victory, must be regarded differently from a moral viewpoint from those Independents who, in the German defeat, staked everything to facilitate the overwhelming victory of the enemy's "policy of force." In this

way they delivered a blow from behind to those who were fighting for the right in the enemy countries. They betrayed the Internationale as well as the Fatherland. The possibility of a just peace was lost when Germany forfeited the power to say at the peace table, "For our rights and our freedom we will again risk a desperate struggle."

The original plan of the October Government before the incidents at Kiel was, after the abdication of the Kaiser, to make another attempt to refuse the conditions of the armistice, and, if necessary, to undertake a struggle of desperation. It was a difficult, perhaps an impossible task, for at that time the belief in Wilson was overwhelming in Germany. "We need no military protection at the Conference; Wilson will protect us." This was the childish belief which at that time prevailed among millions in Germany. "The terms of the armistice are of no importance; only the terms of peace." This was stated to me in my Cabinet. "Wilson leaves the armistice to Foch so that he can arrange the terms of peace." Such was the popular opinion.

The six months of the armistice were harder for Germany than the four years of the war which preceded them. The sinking of the Lusitania, the execution of Miss Cavell, the invasion of Belgium, and other terrible deeds were committed, as has been said, in the fight for victory, in the passionate struggle for national existence which dulled the conscience of the nation. "The Allied and Associated Governments during the armistice killed hundreds of thousands of German non-combatants in cold blood, after victory had been won and assured to them" beyond the shadow of a doubt. I have always been in favor of punishing soldiers who, in the heart of battle, refuse mercy to the disarmed foe. But the soldier who is overcome by the heat of passion stands head and shoulders above the doctor who has means of relief at his disposal and is in a position to help, and who refuses that help to the wounded foe after the battle. This was what the Allied and Associated Governments did. They can never again invoke the name of the Red Cross. And our enemies did not act in the dark.

Today the startling report of Dr. Starling in the English press is before us, telling of the moral and physical prostration of the German people in consequence of the blockade. The report of Professors Rubner, Thomas, Zuntz, Moritz, Pfügge, and Hahn, dated December 26, 1918, which is before me, states: that through the action of the blockade about 800 people died daily in Germany; that among small children the mortality was almost double; that among infants and growing children the death rate from tuberculosis in large cities was twice as high as before the war; the deaths of mothers from puerperal fever was increased two-thirds; that the doctors were helpless in many curable cases because the necessary medicines and food were not available; that in consequence of undernourishment the entire nation was attacked by a nervous ailment, which destroyed its initiative and weakened all moral restraints; that hundreds of thousands of mothers were not in a position to nurse back their convalescent children to complete health, because they could not feed them, so that many chronic ailments will remain for life; in a word, that the strength of the coming generation was impaired at the roots.

This report came to the knowledge of the best-informed Americans; it was issued on December 30, and without doubt

came into the hands of Mr. Hoover. Yet after the publication of this document, America waited four months before the delivery of foodstuffs began. This outweighs in the sight of God and of man the sinking of the Lusitania. Tirpitz will be regarded in history as an honest but ruthless exponent of an extinct world policy. He fought with visor open for his country's might, regardless of the rights of other nations. The judgment on Wilson's actions will be more severe, for he announced his new creed with the fervor of a prophet, and then sanctioned the policy of those false idols whom he had condemned during the war. He committed the worst treason of all, the treason against his own ideals. Even up to the time of the Peace Conference he still had followers in Germany. Today he has none.

And now, what is the result of the crime of Versailles? The forces of democracy, the Social Democrats, the Centre, and the Democrats, secured an overwhelming majority among the German people in the vote for the National Assembly. Today the democratic parties are losing to the Right and to the Left. They are losing to the Pan-Germans, who have been morally rehabilitated in the eyes of the German people by their kindred spirits, Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George. They are losing on the Left to the followers of Lenin and Trotsky. If this process continues, it means civil war, it means a physical, and what is equally bad, a lasting moral civil war. The nation is torn in two, and the different factions hate each other far more than they hate the enemy.

What can help us? We need a bloodless revolution among the countries of the Allies, such as the October Government aspired to bring about, a change of heart. We need a refuge. Something like a sudden reawakening of the European conscience must come. It will not be sufficient to amend one or the other of those inhuman clauses of the Versailles contract. The false foundations of the treaty must be destroyed, above all Article 231. The whole pharisaical spirit of this frightful document must be foresworn; the nations must meet not as judge and accused, but as brother sinners.

From America I hope for no further moral support. The Americans are acting rightly in no longer taking any moral interest in European affairs. Their excursion into European politics has not been a happy one. America prevented a European peace of understanding by its entry into the war. America should have brought about the overwhelming triumph of the Entente, but only on one condition: that it had confidence in its strength, and actually possessed the strength, to prevent the misuse of victory. It is for Europe to seize the dying torch from the hand of the false prophet, Wilson, and to light it anew.

The great question is, can the League of Nations, as it was conceived feeble and malformed at Versailles, still be developed into an effective instrument of an international conscience? The answer reads: yes, if the nations will change their Governments, and above all the spirit of their Governments. The cry for an international tribunal which has moral authority and behind which stands a compelling force, is today overwhelming. One hears it in the European chaos; one hears it in the Baltic provinces, in Poland, in Armenia; one hears it wherever minorities are being coerced; one hears it wherever human beings are being traded as the property of strategic boundaries; one hears it in the occupied German territory; one hears it from millions of prisoners who have not yet been released. If this international tribunal is formed, then there is still a ray of hope; otherwise Germany and Europe are doomed.

*[This statement is quoted from Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech before the Peace Conference on the occasion of the presentation of the peace treaty to the German delegation, on May 7.—EDITOR.]

Documents

The Terms of the Protocol

THE following text of the protocol and note sent by the Supreme Council to the German Government on November 6, appeared in *The London Times* of November 8. On December 8, after protests by the German Government, the Supreme Council was reported to have agreed to consider the economic effects on Germany of the indemnities required for the sinking of the warships at Scapa Flow "in a spirit of equity after a hearing by the Reparation Commission."

I. At the moment of proceeding to the first deposit of the ratifications of the peace treaty, it is recorded that the obligations hereinafter mentioned, which by the conventions of the armistice and the complementary agreements Germany pledged herself to execute, have not been carried out or have not received complete satisfaction.

(1) By Clause 7 of the armistice convention of November 11, 1918, Germany pledged herself to deliver up 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons. There still remain to be delivered 42 locomotives and 4,460 wagons.

(2) By Clause 12 of the armistice convention of November 11, 1918, Germany pledged herself to withdraw behind her frontiers German troops in Russian territory as soon as the Allies had decided that the time had arrived. This withdrawal of troops has not been effected in spite of the requests repeated on August 28, September 27, and October 10, 1919.

(3) By Clause 14 of the armistice convention of November 11, 1918, Germany pledged herself to cease immediately all requisitions, seizures, or coercive measures in Russian territory. The German troops have continued to have recourse to these measures.

(4) By Clause 19 of the armistice convention of November 11, 1918, Germany pledged herself to return all documents, cash securities (portable securities and issuing plant) affecting public and private interests in the invaded countries. The complete list of cash and notes carried off or confiscated by the Germans in the invaded countries has not yet been returned.

(5) The armistice agreement of November 11, 1918, Clause 22: the pledge to hand over all the German submarines. The destruction of the German submarine U.C.48 off Ferrol by order of its German commander, and the destruction in the North Sea of a certain number of submarines on their way to England to be handed over.

(6) The armistice agreement of November 11, 1918, Clause 23: the pledge to maintain in the Allied ports certain German warships, indicated by the Allied and Associated Powers, these warships being destined for eventual surrender. Clause 31: the pledge not to destroy any ship before delivery. On June 21, 1919, the destruction at Scapa Flow of the aforesaid warships.

(7) The protocol of December 17, 1918, annexed to the armistice agreement of December 13, 1918: the pledge to restore the *objets d'art* and art treasures taken from France and Belgium. All the art treasures taken into unoccupied Germany have not yet been restored.

(8) The armistice agreement of January 16, 1919, Clause 3, and protocol 392/i.; additional Clause 3, of July 25, 1919: the pledge to deliver agricultural machines, to replace the supplementary railway material laid down in Schedules 1 and 2 annexed to the protocol of Spa of December 17, 1918. These were not delivered on the date laid down, i. e., October 1, 1919. The following is a detailed list: 40 Heucke ploughing teams, all the cultivators for the teams, all the spades, 1,500 shovels, 1,130 ploughs T.M. 23/26, 1,765 ploughs T.F. 18/21, 1,512 ploughs T.F. 23/26, 629 Brabants T.F.O. m. 20, and 1,605 Brabants T.F.O. m. 26, 4,282 harrows of 2.k.500, 2,157 steel cultivators, 996 manure distributors 2m.50, and 1,608 manure distributors 3m.50.

(9) The armistice agreement of January 16, 1919, Clause 6: the pledge to restore industrial material carried off from French and Belgian territory. All this material has not been restored.

(10) The armistice agreement of January 16, 1919, Clause 5: the pledge to place the whole German mercantile fleet at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. A certain number of the ships, the handing over of which had been demanded in virtue of this clause, have not been delivered.

II. The protocols of the conferences of Brussels of March 13 and 14, 1919: the pledge not to export war materials of all kinds, forbidding the export of aeronautical material to Sweden, Holland, and Denmark. A certain number of the aforementioned stipulations, which have not been carried out or only incompletely carried out, have been renewed by the treaty of June 28, 1919, the entry into force of which will render rightly applicable the penalties which are provided in it. This is also the case particularly as regards the various prestations stipulated for under the heading of reparations. On the other hand, the question of the evacuation of the Baltic provinces has been the subject of an exchange of notes and of decisions which are now being carried out. The Allied and Associated Powers expressly confirm the contents of their notes, which Germany by the present protocol pledges herself to carry out loyally and strictly. Finally, the Allied and Associated Powers would not be able to pass over without punishment the other failures to fulfil the armistice agreements and violations of the agreements as serious as the destruction of the German fleet at Scapa Flow, the destruction of the submarine U.C.48 off Ferrol, and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines proceeding to England to be handed over. In consequence, Germany pledges herself:

(1) (a) To deliver as reparation for the destruction of the German fleet at Scapa Flow, within a period of ninety days to date from the signing of the present protocol, and under the conditions provided in Article 185, Paragraph II., of the peace treaty, the five following light cruisers, the Königsberg, Pillau, Graudenz, Regensburg, and Strasburg; within a period of ninety days to date from the signing of the present protocol, in good condition in all respects and ready for service, such a number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs, and dredgers, equivalent to a total displacement of 400,000 tons, as the principal Allied and Associated Powers may demand. As regards the docks, the lifting power shall be considered as displacement. Among the number of docks provided for above, there will be about 75 per cent. of docks of more than 10,000 tons. The whole of this material will be handed over on the spot.

(b) To deliver within a period of ten days, to date from the signing of the present protocol, a complete list of all the floating docks, tugs, and dredgers belonging to Germany. This list, which will be handed to the Inter-Allied Naval Control Commission, provided for by Article 209 of the peace treaty, will account for the material which on November 11, 1918, belonged to the German Government or in the ownership of which the German Government had at that date an important interest.

(c) The officers and men who formed the crews of the warships sunk at Scapa Flow, and who are now detained by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, with the exception of those whose handing over is provided for by Article 228 of the peace treaty, will be repatriated at the latest when Germany has fulfilled the above paragraphs (a) and (b).

(d) The destroyer B.98 will be considered as one of the forty-two destroyers, the handing over of which is provided for in Article 185 of the peace treaty.

(2) To deliver within a period of ten days, to date from the signing of the present protocol, the machines and motors of the submarines U.137, U.138, and U.158, as compensation for the destruction of the submarine U.C.48, as well as the three motors of the submarine U.146, which remain to be delivered, in compensation for the submarines destroyed in the North Sea. To pay to the Allied and Associated Powers the value of exported aeronautical material according to the decisions which will be given and the estimates which will be made and notified by the

Commission on Aeronautical Control, provided for in Article 210 of the peace treaty, before January 31, 1920. In the event of Germany not fulfilling these obligations within the period provided for above, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve to themselves the right to have recourse to all measures of military or other coercion which they may judge appropriate.

The text of the note to the German Government is as follows:

By the terms of the final dispositions of the treaty signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, it has been stipulated that a first *procès-verbal* of deposit of the ratifications shall be drawn up, as soon as the treaty has been ratified, by Germany on the one hand and by three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand. The President of the Peace Conference has the honor to bring to the notice of the German Government that three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers—viz., the British Empire, France, and Italy, have ratified the treaty. The stipulation, recalled above, has been fulfilled. The other Allied and Associated Powers which have up to the present time notified their ratification are Belgium, Poland, and Siam.

In execution of the aforementioned dispositions and if the various acts necessary for the putting into force of the treaty are satisfactory, it will be proceeded with in Paris at a date to be fixed shortly, and will be notified five days in advance in the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of these ratifications. The German Government is requested to be so good as to participate in the final dispositions of the treaty. From the date of this first *procès-verbal* the treaty will enter into force between the High Contracting Parties, who will have thus ratified it. For the calculation of all periods of delay provided for in the present treaty this date will be that of the entry into force.

The Allied and Associated Powers have decided not to put the treaty into force before having settled and specified the carrying out of the obligations which by the armistice agreement and the complementary conventions Germany had pledged herself to fulfil, and which have not been satisfactorily accomplished. The German Government is in consequence requested to give to the German representative empowered to sign the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications full powers to sign also the protocol of which a copy is attached and which provides for this settlement without further delay. Otherwise the entry into force of the treaty brings certain consequences which it is important to outline here:

(1) The entry upon its duties of the Inter-Allied High Commission for the Rhine territories (Treaty Article 2).

(2) The entry upon their duties of the military, naval, and aeronautical delegations of control (Treaty Article 203).

(3) The entry upon its duties of the Reparation Commission (Treaty Article 233 and Annex 11, paragraph 5).

(4) The transfer of sovereignty in the case of Memel and of Danzig (Treaty Article 100), having as result the evacuation of German troops and authorities and the occupation of these territories by inter-Allied troops.

(5) The transference of government in the Saar Basin (Treaty Article 49 and Annex, paragraph 16).

(6) The transfer of temporary government in the territory of Upper Silesia submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty Article 88 and Annex, paragraphs 1 and 2), having as result the evacuation of German troops and authorities whom the Commission shall designate and the occupation by inter-Allied troops, as well as the entry upon its duties of the commission for the government and the plebiscite on this territory.

(7) The transfer of the temporary administration in the territory of Schleswig submitted for plebiscite (Treaty Article 109) having as result the evacuation of German troops and authorities and the occupation by inter-Allied troops as well as the entry upon its duties of the commission for the administration and plebiscite on this territory.

(8) The beginning of the period of fifteen days within which must be effected the evacuation and the transfer of the temporary administrations in the territories submitted to plebiscite in

East Prussia and Allenstein (Treaty Article 97) having as result the evacuation of German troops and authorities and the occupation by inter-Allied troops as well as the entry upon their duties of the commissions for the administration and plebiscite of these territories; and

(9) The beginning of the period of fifteen days within which the delimitation commissions must commence their operations.

In consequence the German Government is from the present date invited to send to Paris for November 10, 1919, representatives with powers:

(1) To settle in agreement with the representative of the Allied and Associated Powers the conditions of the installation of the commissions of government, administration, and plebiscite, the handing over of powers, the transmission of services, the entry of the inter-Allied troops, the evacuation of German troops, the replacing of the designated authorities, and all other questions provided for above. It is recalled that from the present date the German authorities must leave in place all the installations of services and dwellings, as well as the documents which will be of service for the entry into immediate action of the inter-Allied authorities, and that the German troops must also leave in position all the installations which they are occupying.

(2) To settle, in agreement with the General Staff of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated armies, the conditions of the transport of the inter-Allied troops.

British Treatment of Russian Prisoners

THE following statement by M. Chicherin, which is reprinted from *Folkets Dagblad Politiken* (Stockholm) by the *Worker's Dreadnought* (London) of November 22, is interesting in view of the negotiations now being carried on at Copenhagen with regard to an exchange of prisoners, by Mr. O'Grady for the British Government and M. Litvinov for the Russian Soviet Government. It is also of interest in view of the statement recently made in the House of Commons that the Soviet leaders would be held individually responsible for any harm that might come to British prisoners in Bolshevik prisons.

The Soviet Government is indignant at the inhuman way in which the British Command at Archangel is treating its Russian prisoners. If the British Government were responsible indirectly for the innumerable cruelties and atrocities committed on Russian workers and peasants by its agents Kolchak, Denikin, and the rest, cruelties in comparison with which the Spanish Inquisition was child's play, then we have proof positive now of Russian prisoners of war being similarly treated by the British Command direct. Some soldiers who succeeded in making their escape from British imprisonment in North Russia told of several comrades who were shot immediately after being taken prisoners. They had themselves been mercilessly beaten with the butt ends of rifles, put in prison, kept half starved, and forced to work till they dropped. They were threatened with being shot if they refused to join the British-Russian Anti-Revolutionary Legion and betray their comrades. In many cases these threats were actually carried out. The Soviet Government hereby informs the British Government that it is compelled, in consequence of these happenings, to withdraw the many privileges and liberties hitherto granted to British officer prisoners in Moscow and to those recently captured on the Onega front. We have found that protests are of no avail, and we know the callousness of the British Government for the sufferings of all Russians who do not support the anti-revolutionaries. We therefore resort to this method in the hope that the British Command may act in a more humane way towards their prisoners, and by so doing make conditions of life easier for their own captive officers. The Soviet Government will continue, how-

ever, to treat the rank and file prisoners in the most friendly way, except those who have volunteered for service in Russia in the reactionary army and for the reinstatement of monarchy in Russia. As to the impudent threats of Lord Curzon, received by wireless on August 10, the Soviet Government declares that no threatening letters can influence its policies. Every repetition of such threats directed to individual members of the Soviet Government adds to the possibility that the Soviet Government may be forced to consider if it can continue to negotiate with the British Government even with regard to the exchange of prisoners.

CHICHERIN

Commissar for Foreign Affairs

Foreign Press

The Question of War Responsibility

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (London) is publishing a series of valuable articles on the question of responsibility for the war. In the October issue a special supplement is devoted to an article by Mr. E. D. Morel on recent revelations concerning pre-war diplomacy. Mr. Morel gives an admirable analysis of the secret diplomatic negotiations which finally culminated in the war. The documents upon which he bases his conclusions are (1) the correspondence from the Czar's secret archives, published in *Pravda* by the Russian Soviet Government (extracts from these documents were published in The International Relations Section of *The Nation* of August 9 and discussed editorially in the same issue), (2) the German White Book, presented to the Peace Conference, (3) "Causes of the War," by M. Bogitschevitch, former Serbian diplomat, (4) the French Yellow Book on the Franco-Russian Alliance, and (5) British White Book No. 17. From these sources, beginning with the year 1912, Mr. Morel has collated evidence to prove that no one belligerent can fairly be charged with exclusive responsibility for the war. His article, which is reinforced by numerous quotations from the documents mentioned, may be briefly outlined as follows:

In 1912 Russian diplomats, in pursuance of Russia's double design to destroy Austria-Hungary and win Constantinople and the Straits, were busy fomenting war in the Balkans. During that year the Balkan League was formed under Russian auspices, its pivot being the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, to which was attached a secret supplement making military action by either party subject to the dictation of Russia. In the same year the Franco-Russian Naval Convention was signed, preceded by a new disposition of the French fleet favorable to war strategy. Later in the year, Russia sent M. Isvolsky to France and M. Sazonov to England, to make sure of the attitude of those nations in case trouble in the Balkans should involve Germany, as Austria's ally. M. Poincaré assured M. Isvolsky that if Germany came to Austria's aid France would regard such action as a *casus foederis*, while Sir Edward Grey told M. Sazonov that in such a case Russia could rely on Great Britain to "stake everything in order to inflict the most serious blow to German power." Immediately following these conversations Russia embarked upon elaborate war preparations, increasing its military expenditures by millions of pounds in excess of corresponding increases in the German and Austrian armies.

In September, 1912, the first Balkan War broke out. Germany's restraining influence upon Austria during the acute diplomatic crises which accompanied this war and the one which followed it was generally recognized in Europe. Austria was not drawn in, but during the second Balkan War, when Russia found it necessary to prevent a collision between Serbia and Bulgaria over the spoils of the first war, the inducement offered

to persuade Serbia to modify its demands was the prospect of a new war, after which it was to be compensated with Austrian territory. Meanwhile Russian diplomacy was influential enough to secure the passage by the French Government of the Three Years' Service Law, in spite of the bitter opposition of the Socialists and the other parties of the Left.

Early in 1914 events began to move rapidly. On February 2 the Serbian "Minister-President," M. Pashitch, had an interview with the Czar in which the latter agreed to furnish M. Sazonov with a list of Serbia's military needs, and told M. Pashitch to assure his King that Russia would "do all" for Serbia. On February 21 a council of war was held at Petrograd to elaborate "a general program of action in order to secure . . . a favorable solution of the question of the Straits." Following this council, Russian papers stated that Russian military policy would be no longer "defensive," but "active." In April Sir Edward Grey visited Paris, where he held a conference with French Ministers. M. Isvolsky's report to M. Sazonov of this conference shows that Sir Edward Grey was not only deeply involved with France, but was quite ready to form a closer alliance with Russia. Subsequently M. Sazonov reported to the Czar that the British Government had "decided to empower the English Admiralty Staff to enter into negotiations with French and Russian Naval agents in London for the purpose of drawing up technical conditions for a possible action by the naval forces of England, Russia, and France." Russian diplomats thus succeeded in making sure of both British and French assistance in carrying out their designs.

On June 28, 1914, came the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo. It is now known that the murderers were Serbian army officers, to whom posthumous honors have been rendered by their Government. M. Bogitschevitch declares that Serbia was responsible for the crime, and points out that Serbia's indifference to Austria's possible action in the matter clearly indicated that "Serbia must have been assured that war against Germany and Austria had been resolved upon and the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne furnished a favorable pretext for war, only because England and France had allowed themselves to be drawn into this conflict . . . by Russia." As to final mobilization by Russia, Mr. Morel points out that under the understanding existing between Russia and France (French Yellow Book) general mobilization was "a declaration of war," and quotes a dispatch from M. Isvolsky to M. Sazonov, dated July 30, showing that France was fully cognizant of Russia's action in mobilizing, although on July 31 M. Viviani told the German Ambassador that he was "in no way informed as to the alleged complete mobilization of the Russian army and navy."

The November issue contains the first part of an article touching on the same question by M. Georges Demartial, Officer of the Legion of Honor, which may be summarized as follows:

M. Demartial quotes President Poincaré's statement of August 4, 1914, that Germany "sought to surprise us treacherously in the very midst of diplomatic conversations," and points to the fact that French mobilization took place on August 1; that on August 2 French newspapers declared, "it is war;" and that Germany did not finally declare war on France until the night of August 3. And in the matter of prolonging the war M. Demartial holds the Allies to be exclusively responsible. He quotes their reply to President Wilson's note of December 19, 1916, suggesting negotiations, that a peace for "the establishment upon firm foundations of the future of the nations of Europe" did not then seem attainable, and that the Allies, "conscious that they are not fighting for selfish interests," and had not "desired or provoked" the war, could accept only a "victorious end." Yet at the same time that M. Briand was sending this reply a French mission was in Petrograd negotiating a convention under which Russia and France agreed to take everything they could from Germany in the East and West respectively.

